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RESPONDING TO THE SUBPRIME MESS:  
THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
David Schmudde* 
ABSTRACT 
An era of unregulated financial markets has resulted in an unpre-
cedented global financial disaster.  The world’s largest central banks 
and governments are scrambling in uncharted waters to avoid a 
complete meltdown.  Trillions of dollars have been allocated towards 
financial recovery in the United States alone. 
How did we get to this point?  The unlikely culprit was residential 
mortgages in the U.S.  Regulatory bodies took no action as irrespon-
sibility and greed fueled this market’s rapid growth.  One of the great 
financial bubbles was created. Financial instruments were created, 
given an imprimatur by rating agencies, and sold the world over.  
These seemingly secure investments, backed by mortgages on resi-
dences in the United States, were purchased by millions of unwary 
and sophisticated investors on an unparalleled international scale.  
The investment banks, anxious to ride a wave of profitability, created 
more and riskier investments as the bubble inflated. Part II of this 
Article describes the mortgage landscape which predated the col-
lapse. 
In 2006, the housing market peaked and began its crash, bringing 
with it all of the purchasers of the mortgage backed financial instru-
ments. 
All the players in the residential housing market were devastated.  
Homeowners lost their homes.  Mortgage lenders disappeared.  
Investment banks either went out of business, or merely survived 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY.  The author 
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thanks to government infusions of cash.  Investors in some mortgage 
backed securities lost virtually all the value of their investment.  And 
stock markets around the world crashed with a resounding thud, 
wiping out vast amounts of wealth. 
How did this happen?  Where were the regulators?  What are the 
weaknesses in our residential mortgage funding system? 
Part III of this Article analyzes the mortgage market, its weaknesses, 
and its regulatory scheme. The causes of the problem – namely 
irresponsible borrowers, greedy lenders, unresponsive regulators, the 
overzealous mortgage backed securities market, the rush by foreign 
investors to place money in U.S. investments, the irresponsibility of 
the credit rating agencies, and the collusion of appraisers – are 
discussed and scrutinized. 
Part IV breaks down the new regulations and legislation enacted in 
the wake of the financial meltdown.  Part V examines Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, their ultimate decline, and resulting takeover by 
the federal government.  Part VI discusses and analyzes the various 
lawsuits which have arisen from the mortgage meltdown. 
Finally, Part VII attempts to specify weaknesses in the residential 
mortgage funding system, and to propose elements which must be 
addressed in creating a more stable, yet responsive mortgage market 
in the future. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The last year has produced a debacle of worldwide proportions in 
the residential mortgage market.  An orgy of lending has collapsed.  A 
few years ago, it would have been preposterous to believe that the real 
estate market in the United States could have such a significant impact 
on world financial markets.  As the real estate bubble inflated and crea-
tive mortgage methods were invented, all proven rules were ignored.  
The questions to ask are:  Where were the regulators?  Where was the 
legislature?  It had become apparent as early as in 2004 that consumers 
were getting mortgages which made no rational sense.1  No one, 
 1. Erick Bergquist, Identifying Soft Spots in Fight Against Fraud, AM. BANKER, 
Sept. 27, 2004, at 6; Mike Nixon, Federal Agencies Target Real Estate Lending Fraud, 
ST. LOUIS DAILY REC., Oct. 1, 2004; Interview by Gerri Willis with Marianne McCarty, 
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however, denied mortgages to these consumers.  It is time to examine 
the wreckage and attempt to learn the lessons needed to prevent such a 
crisis from recurring in the future. 
As the suckling was being nursed into the leviathan, a new breed of 
people calling themselves mortgage brokers were driving the feeding 
frenzy in order to generate outsized fees.  Consumers, ignoring basic 
financial advice, were entering into mortgages they simply could not 
repay.  Everyone seemed to think that real estate prices would rise 
forever. 
For its part, Wall Street was creating new financial vehicles called 
mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”) at a frightening pace.2  These 
MBSs were packaged, securitized, rated by credit rating agencies 
(“CRAs”) and sold to investors as secure investments.  Investors seeking 
higher returns in the U.S. and abroad were eagerly buying these high-
yielding mortgage-backed securities, thereby providing increased fund-
ing for new mortgages.  Appraisers, driven by their clients to appraise 
properties to support inflated mortgages, were apparently willing to 
ignore their own rules to meet the growing pace of mortgage applica-
tions.3  Arguably the most important players, the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), did nothing. 
Mortgage Bankers Association, & Jean Chatzky, on CNNfn Open House (Sept. 20, 
2004). 
 2. Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, How Resilient Are Mortgage Backed 
Securities to Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions? (Feb. 15, 2007) 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 27, available at http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ 
Mason_RosnerFeb15Event.pdf) (illustrating, in Figure 13, the rise in annual issuance of 
CDOs from nearly zero in 1995 to over $500 billion in 2006); George Anders, Easy 
Money: A Mortgage Salesman’s Pitch, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2005, at A1.  Anders 
quotes Benchmark Lending Group Inc. founder N. Bernard “Barney” Aldridge scoffing 
at people who pay down their mortgages month by month, as “just a way of transferring 
money to your heirs,” instead arguing, “I’d rather make smaller payments and have the 
money myself.”  Expanding loan volumes allowed subprime creditor Benchmark 
Lending Group Inc. to double its loan volume to $900 million (projected as of publish-
ing date) between 2004 and 2005.  Benchmark did most of its business by phone, only 
advertising briskly on AM radio during the height of the housing boom in 2005.  Id. 
 3. Complaint at 8-9, People v. First Am. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51790 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 10397), available at  http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_ 
center/2007/nov/EA%20Complaint.pdf; Complaint at 11, Koesterer v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 
No. 2:08-Civ-00387 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://securities.stanford. 
edu/1038/WM_01/2007115_f01c_0709801.pdf; Complaint at 12, Wertz v. Wash. Mut. 
Bank, No. 2:2008-Civ-00317 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008), available at http:// 
appraisalnewsonline.typepad.com/appraisal_news_for_real_e/files/WertzPrimarySuit.p
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The Federal Reserve Board was empowered by Congress in 1994 to 
regulate mortgage issuers,4 but chose instead to watch from the sidelines 
while a bubble was created.5  When a bubble is forming and prices are 
rising, as in a Ponzi scheme, nobody gets hurt.  Then, as the bubble 
accelerates, there is the necessary reckoning – the collapse of prices.  
We have all heard the experts opining that real estate prices in the U.S. 
never decline.6  New rationales were developed to describe why the 
df; Petition from Concerned Real Estate Appraisers From Across America to Ben 
Henson, Executive Dir., Appraisal Subcomm., Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, 
available at http://appraiserspetition.com; Lew Sichelman, Most Fraud Charges Not 
Investigated, REALTY TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, http://realtytimes.com/printrtpages/2006 
1018_fraudcharges.htm; Sarah Max, Appraisal Fraud: Your Home at Risk, 
CNNMONEY.COM, June 2, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/23/real_estate/finan 
cing/appraisalfraud/index.htm; Posting of Vernon Martin to Appraisers Forum, http:// 
appraisersforum.com/showthread.php?t=141764 (July 14, 2008, 01:41 EST). 
 4. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994). 
 5. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 
77,249, 77251 (Dec. 29, 2005), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/banking/notices/ 
2006/not0601.pdf (“Nontraditional mortgage loan products are more complex than tra-
ditional fixed rate products and adjustable rate products and present greater risks of 
payment shock and negative amortization. Institutions should ensure that consumers are 
provided clear and balanced information about the relative benefits and risks of these 
products at a time that will help consumers’ decision-making processes.”); 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, ASSET SECURITIZATION: 
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 33 (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
handbook/assetsec.pdf (noting that “rising delinquencies and charge-offs, inaccurate 
investor reporting, and bad publicity, have occurred in the later stages of the trans-
action.  The bank should supervise and monitor a transaction for the duration of the 
institution’s involvement.”); see also id. at 40 (noting “[b]ecause originating banks 
absorb most of the expected losses from both on balance-sheet and securitized pools, 
sound underwriting standards and practices remain the best overall protection against 
excessive credit exposure.”). 
 6. See, e.g., The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before J. Econ. Comm., 109th Cong. 
(2005) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 
1987-2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2005/ 
200506092/default.htm (testifying before Congress in 2005, Greenspan said: “Although 
a ‘bubble’ in home prices for the nation as a whole does not appear likely, there do 
appear to be, at a minimum, signs of froth in some local markets where home prices 
seem to have risen to unsustainable levels.”); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve 
Bd., Remarks Before the Conference on Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the 
Macroeconomy (May 19, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050519/default.htm) (speaking before an audience of hous-
ing bankers, Greenspan said:  “In a market system, lenders and investors typically 
monitor and discipline the activities, including leverage, of their counterparties to assure 
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increases in home values were sustainable.  This is a tale of greed and 
irresponsibility.  A confluence of regulatory neglect, a deviation from 
proven standards and the aggressive development of new financial mar-
kets collided in epochal financial wreckage.  People got hurt financially 
and multiple corporations were destroyed or brought to their knees.7  
Inevitably and expectedly, lawsuits follow financial wreckage and the 
legal fights are assured to last for many years.  Prospective plaintiffs 
face an uphill battle, as many of the entities driving the problem mort-
gages have already ceased to exist or sought bankruptcy protection.8  
People need to learn from this event, and make certain they do not fall 
into these traps in the future. 
Ultimately, as in any financial bubble, risks were improperly 
evaluated.  The lack of responsibility for risky investments did not rest 
with the decision makers.  Home buyers, relying upon rising prices, 
entered into mortgages that they were ill equipped to pay.  Mortgage 
banks, because they did not retain ownership of the mortgages, looked 
only to maximize the profits to be made from the mortgage transaction.  
Investment banks, a vast majority of them content to offload the risk 
associated with the mortgage investments, were packaging the mort-
gages and selling them forward with the imprimatur of ratings agencies, 
which failed to accurately convey the risks associated with these 
investments.  The investment banks even offered financing to investors 
to buy the flawed investment bundles in an attempt to leverage their own 
balance sheets.  The CRAs, either through negligence or in blind pursuit 
of profits, issued deeply flawed analyses of the risks involved in buying 
the securitized instruments.9  Investors, reassured by inaccurate credit 
themselves that these entities are financially sound.”); Neil Barsky, What Housing 
Bubble?, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2005, at A10 (arguing “[o]ur strong housing market is a 
function of myriad factors with real economic underpinnings: low interest rates, local 
job growth, the emotional attachment one has for one’s home, one’s view of one’s 
future earning-power, and parental contributions, all have done their part to contribute 
to rising home prices”); Greg Ip, Housing Prices Aren’t Fed Target, Greenspan Says, 
WALL ST. J., July 19, 2005, at A2; Ruth Simon, Mortgage Lenders Loosen Standards, 
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at D1. 
 7. David Evans, Banks on the Edge, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2008, at ¶ 8, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/marketsmag/mm_1108_story1.html (reflecting on the worst wave 
of bank failures since 1992.). 
 8. Scott Bertschi, Courts Will Dilute Liability Among Participants in Subprime 
Mortgages, in FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 73, 74 (Skupien ed., Thomson West 
2008). 
 9. Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, at 36 
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ratings and lured by attractive yields, bought these instruments even if 
they did not understand them.10 
As in the aftermath of all bubbles, the value of these investments 
quickly eroded.  The price was paid by most, but not all, of the parties 
involved.  Home buyers who defaulted on their mortgages lost the fees 
charged in the mortgage transaction, as well as their equity in the prop-
erty, if they ever had any.  Investors lost value on their investments.  
Investment banks lost tremendous sums holding and financing the 
mortgage securities.  The mortgage brokers, however, made huge profits 
from selling the defective loans, and then went out of business.11  The 
CRAs also pocketed significant fees from issuing defective ratings 
(describing ratings agencies as “a central culprit in the mortgage bust”); Aaron 
Lucchetti, Rating Game:  As Housing Boomed, Moody’s Opened Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
11, 2008, at A1 (quoting former Moody’s analyst Mark Froeba as saying, “[a] palpable 
erosion of institutional support for rating analysis that threatened [Moody’s] market 
share” during the credit boom”). 
 10. See, e.g., Aon Fin. Prods. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding a credit default swap (“CDS”) agreement Aon purchased from Societe 
Generale (“SG”) – to reduce Aon’s own risk exposure to a CDS Aon issued to Bear 
Stearns (“BS”) to protect BS from a default by a Philippine Government agency 
(“GSIS”), which issued BS a surety bond securing a loan BS made to a developer of a 
condominium complex in the Philippines – did not require SG to pay Aon the CDS 
benefit because neither the underlying default nor GSIS’s failure to honor its obligation 
to BS constituted a Failure to Pay under the Aon/SG CDS contract, even though Aon 
was required to pay BS a benefit on the Aon/BS CDS it sought to protect itself against 
through the Aon/SG CDS); John P. Doherty & Richard F. Hans, The Changing 
Landscape of Subprime Litigation, in 13(16) ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. 2, 4-5 
(2007) (citing Complaint at 11-12, MetroPCS Commc’ns v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2007) (No. 07-12430) (alleging broker knowingly sold client CDOs 
which fell outside the company’s stated investment criteria of low-risk, capital 
preservation and liquidity)); JOE MORGAN, HEAD OF PORTFOLIO MGMT., & ADAM DEAN, 
PRESIDENT, SVB FINANCIAL GROUP, AUCTION RATE SECURITIES (Feb. 21, 2008), 
available at http://www.svbassetmanagement.com/pdfs/AuctionRateSecurities0208.pdf. 
 11. Kara Scannell & Phred Dvorak, The Fannie/Freddie Takeover:  Pay Packages 
for CEOs Likely to Spur Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2008, at A21 (Departing 
Freddie Mac CEO Richard Syron will walk away with at least $5 million and may be 
entitled to an additional $8.8 million to compensate for forfeiting recent equity grants, 
while Fannie Mae’s Daniel Mudd is entitled to an estimated $3.2 million in pension.  
Both were forced out when the firms were nationalized on Sept. 7, 2008.); see also 
Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A1 (noting Fannie’s Mudd lost millions of dollars as the 
company’s stock declined, had his severance revoked after the company was seized and 
continues to look for new work). 
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before the market imploded.12  Finally, after the horse has left the barn, 
the federal government, by legislation and by various agencies, has 
reacted to the disaster and issued a slew of new regulations.13  In order 
to avoid these problems in the future, and the massively higher costs 
associated with reactive rather than preemptive measures, it is 
imperative that we look to the root causes of the problems leading to the 
financial 
The lack of responsibility in the proper places caused significant 
dislocations in our financial markets and caused significant pain to home 
buyers.  This Article will detail the causes of the mortgage market col-
lapse, analyze the federal government’s responses and finally discuss 
how the U.S. is to arise out of this mess, and what the world will look 
like when it does.  Part II of this Article will provide a landscape of the 
U.S. home mortgage market as it once was.  The rules are changing; a 
new mortgage market is being created.  For the time being, subprime 
mortgages have disappeared.  If they ever return, the regulatory scheme 
will be very different. 
II. THE OLD MORTGAGE LANDSCAPE 
In the recent mortgage market, mortgages have three broad credit 
quality categories.  The most prevalent type of residential mortgage is 
the “conforming” mortgage.14  Mortgages made to people who had less 
 12. See Lucchetti, supra note 9 (noting Moody’s share price quintupled during the 
boom as profits rose 375% in six years); Moody’s Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
(SEC File 1-14037), at 14 (Mar. 1, 2007) (reporting net income of $753.9 million in 
2006, nearly double the $363.9 million Moody’s earned in 2003). 
 13. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522-01, 44,529-31 (July 30, 
2008).  Amendments to Regulation Z were issued in proposed form on Dec. 17, 2007 
and adopted in final form on July 16, 2008.  If these regulations had been issued a few 
years earlier, they could have provided a significant restraint on poor lending practices.  
For a detailed analysis of new federal regulations in response to the subprime mortgage 
meltdown, see infra Part V. 
 14. Of the loans outstanding in the United States, prime fixed rate loans accounted 
for 65% of the market, and prime ARM for 15%.  Press Release, Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency 
Survey (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/ 
62936.htm; see also Mike Fratantoni, Characteristics of Outstanding Residential 
Mortgage Debt: 2006, MBA RESEARCH: DATA NOTES (Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 
Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2007, at 3 chart 10, available at http://www.mortgagebankers. 
org/files/Bulletin/InternalResource/47210_DataNoteCharacteristicsofOuttandingReside
ntialMortgageDebtfor2006.pdf.  As of July 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac insured 
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than stellar credit or to people who would have little or no equity in the 
property are called subprime mortgages.15  “Alt-A” mortgages involve 
risks somewhere between these two categories.16  In addition, many 
other mortgages were obtained by predatory lending.  Many others also 
carry characteristics of adjustable, not fixed, rates. 
A.  Conforming Mortgages 
Conforming mortgages are so named because they meet the stand-
ards required for purchase by Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”).17  Conforming designation only applies to mortgages 
 
70 % of all new mortgages.  Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y of the Treasury, Remarks on 
U.S. Housing Market Before FDIC’s Forum on Mortgage Lending to Low and 
Moderate Income Households (July 8, 2008) (transcript available at http://www. 
treasury.gov/press/releases/hp1070.htm). 
 15. Mark Doms et al., House Prices and Subprime Mortgage Delinquencies, 2007-
14 FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, 
CA), June 8, 2007, at ¶ 3, available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/ 
letter/2007/el2007-14.pdf (designating borrowers with low credit scores, such as FICO 
score below 620, with little credit history, or with other types of observable credit 
impairment as “subprime”).  In 2005, the typical “subprime” loan was characterized by 
an adjustable interest rate (93%) and required borrowers with an average FICO score of 
650 to provide little to no documentation of their income (51%).  A significant minority 
were interest only loans (38%) and/or mortgaged non-owner occupied [read: invest-
ment] property (9%).  Amy Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage 
Default: Policies and Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs 48, tbl.3 
(Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available at http://www.freddie 
mac.com/news/pdf/interventions_in_mortgage_default.pdf. 
 16. In 2005, the typical “Alt-A” loan was characterized by an adjustable interest 
rate (72%), negative amortization (67%) and required borrowers with an average FICO 
score of 720 to provide little or no documentation of their income (74%).  See Cutts & 
Merrill, supra note 15, at 48. 
 17. Conforming mortgages eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
are statutorily defined, at  12 U.S.C. § 1717(b)(2) (2008) and 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2) 
(2008), as loans secured by 1-4-family dwelling units with a principal balance no 
greater than 80% of the property value at the time of purchase (with limited exceptions, 
including buyers who purchase private mortgage insurance (“PMI”)) up to 125 % of the 
median 1-family house price in the area, Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-185, 122 Stat. 613, § 201(a)(1)-(2) (1998), or $729,750 (1.75 times the 2008 
conforming loan limit of $417,000), OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER., METROPOLITAN 
STATISTICAL AREAS, MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS AND RURAL COUNTIES WITH 
NEW LOAN LIMITS (2008) [hereinafter MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS], available 
at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/hpi/AREA_LIST_5_2008.pdf.  See Announcement 08-
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with an initial principal amount of less than $417,000.18  Conforming 
mortgages are also required to meet these additional criteria: 
(1) The borrower’s income must be verified (usually with wage 
statements and income tax returns); 
(2) The borrower must have good credit (a credit score of 720 
or higher); 
(3) The proposed mortgage principal must be less than 80% of 
the appraised value of the home (a loan-to-value ratio of 
80% or less); 
(4) The proposed monthly mortgage payment plus the monthly 
real estate tax bill must not exceed 28% of the borrower’s 
gross monthly income; 
(5) The borrower may not have other excessive outstanding 
loans or debt; and 
(6) Total debt payments, including this mortgage, do not 
exceed 35% of the borrower’s gross monthly income.19 
Conforming loans currently remain a safe investment, with less 
than 1% of conforming mortgages in default.20 
11, FannieMae, Jumbo-Conforming Mortgage Loans – Expanded Eligibility and 
Products 9-11, attachment 2 (May 16, 2008), available at https://www.efanniemae.com/ 
sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2008/0811.pdf [hereinafter FannieMae Jumbo Loan 
Announcement]. 
 18. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set standards for conforming loans.  The 
conforming loan maximum was increased from $417,000 to $729,750 until December 
31, 2008 as a mitigation of the poor housing market.  David M. Dickson, Jumbo Loan 
Limits, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at A08.  Mortgages in excess of the conforming 
loan limit are called “jumbo” mortgages.  Id. 
 19. FANNIEMAE, SINGLE-FAMILY MBS PROSPECTUS 50-53 (Apr. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.efanniemae.com/syndicated/documents/mbs/mbspros/SF_April 
_1_2008.pdf (outlining Fannie Mae’s mortgage standards and eligibility guidelines); 
FannieMae Jumbo Loan Announcement, supra note 17; see also 12 U.S.C. § 
1717(b)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2); Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 § 201(a)(1)-(2); 
MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, supra note 17. 
 20. In the second quarter of 2008, less than 1% of all U.S. home mortgage loans 
entered foreclosure, but among subprime ARM’s, 6.35% entered foreclosure.  U.S. 
DEPT. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., U.S. HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS: 2ND QUARTER, 
2008, NATIONAL DATA 24 (2008), available at http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ 
ushmc/summer08/national_data.pdf.  Prime mortgage lending remains much less risky 
than prime lending. While prime fixed rate loans accounted for 65% of all U.S. loans 
originated, at 19% they account for a comparatively small proportion of U.S. 
foreclosures.  Subprime ARMs, by contract, account for only 6% of U.S. loans origina-
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B.  Alt-A Mortgages 
The second type of mortgage credit category is known as “Alt-A.”  
In 2006, Alt-A loans made up about 16% of the mortgage loans made 
that year.21  Alt-A loans generally fail to meet the rules for conforming 
loans, but only by one of the conforming loan requirements.22  For 
example, the credit score may be below conforming standards, but not to 
the point of making the mortgage a subprime loan.  In 2006, credit 
scores from 580-700 would have fit in this category.23  Other reasons 
could be a lack of income documentation, a borrower with high out-
standing credit card debt, or a “jumbo” loan amount.  Alternatively, if 
the mortgage amount exceeds 80% of the value of the home, it would be 
an Alt-A loan. 
Alt-A loans are made at less favorable terms than conforming loans, 
meaning that an Alt-A borrower will usually pay a higher interest rate 
and more fees than a conforming borrower.24  Alt-A loans are question-
 
ted but account for 39% of all foreclosures.  Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 
supra note 14. 
 21. Alt-A loans comprised 13.4% of all originations in 2006.  Just three years 
earlier, in 2003, Alt-A loans made up only 2.2% of the market.  David Greenlaw et al., 
Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown 16, exhibit 3.2 (U.S. 
Monetary Policy Forum Conference Draft, Feb. 9, 2008), available at http://www. 
chicagogsb.edu/usmpf/docs/usmpf2008confdraft.pdf.  Interestingly, as single-family 
originations began falling significantly in the fourth quarter of 2006, Alt-A lending for 
the year still rose 5.3% to $400 billion and home equity lending increased nearly 18% 
to $430 billion during the same period.  Id.  Non-jumbo, prime conventional mortgage 
originations fell 9% to $990 billion in 2006 and represented only 33% of total 
originations.  VALERIE SMITH ET AL., OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, 
MORTGAGE MARKETS AND THE ENTERPRISES IN 2006 8, 11 (June 2007), available at 
http://www.ofheo.gov/media/research/MortgageMarkets2006.pdf. 
 22. In 2006, Alt-A borrowers had an average credit score of 717.  See, e.g., 
KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME MARKETS, 
THE ROLE OF GSE’S, AND RISK-BASED PRICING 4 (Mar. 2002) (noting the high 
percentage of Alt-A borrowers with FICO scores over 720 in 1998); see Cutts & 
Merrill, supra note 15, at 48 tbl.3. 
 23. The Credit Score is the FICO score assigned to a borrower’s credit rating.  The 
score is assigned by Fair Isaac Co.  See Truth in Lending Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1687 
(Jan. 9, 2008) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)) (noting limited transparency of 
prices, products, and originator incentives reduces a borrower’s expected benefit from 
shopping further for a better option). 
 24. These are just a couple of factors that may affect an Alt-A borrower to enter 
default, the recurrence of which would further exacerbate the financial crisis.  See 
David Liu & Shumin Li, Alt-A Credit – The Other Shoe Drops?, THE MARKETPULSE 
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able, but are generally expected to perform in the future.25  The default 
rate of Alt-A loans in 2006 was 4.2%.26 
C.  Subprime Mortgages 
Subprime mortgages are non-conforming mortgages which do not 
meet the standards for conforming loans by a substantial margin.27  Most 
subprime mortgages were, in recent years, made with no verification of 
the borrower’s income.28  Many subprime mortgages were given for or 
close to 100% of the value of the home.29  Many more were obtained by 
borrowers with the worst credit history, a credit score below 580.30  
Remarkably, subprime mortgages grew from $35 billion in 1995 to $807 
billion in 2005.31 
 
(First American LoanPerformance, Inc., San Francisco, C.A.), Dec. 2006, at 8, 
available at http://www.facorelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Newsroom/Innovations_News 
letter/MPDecember2006DataLowRes.pdf (warning an extended period of flat or 
declining housing prices might result in up to a 20% increase in cumulative losses on 
Alt-A debt issues).  Mortgage companies and mortgage brokers generally earned a high-
er fee from lenders when placing a borrower in an Alt-A loan instead of a conforming 
loan.  See, e.g., Gopi Mattel, CellarStone, Inc., Mortgage Broker Commissions and 
Incentives – A Primer, available at http://www.qcommission.com/doc/Mortgage-
Broker-SalesCommissions-A-Primer-Article.pdf. 
 25. See Liu & Li, supra note 24, at 6-7. 
 26. Excluding “pay option” ARM Loans.  Mark Goldberg & Jeff Watson, 
Performance of U.S. RMBS Alt-A Loans Continues to Deteriorate, RATINGSDIRECT 
(Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), June 26, 2007, at 1, available at http://www2. 
standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/subprime_deteriorate_062607.pdf. 
 27. It is interesting to note that the word subprime did not come to have this 
meaning until 1993.  See Simon Winchester, Subprime, Pre-Slime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2008, at A31. 
 28. In 2005 and 2006 over half of all subprime loans were made with little to no 
documentation of the borrowers income.  See Cutts & Merrill, supra note 15, at 48 
tbl.3. 
 29. At the time of origination 35.9% of subprime loans exceeded 90% of the 
property’s appraised value (LTV ratio).  An additional 22.3% were subject to a second 
lien.  See Scott Frame et al., A Snapshot of Mortgage Conditions with an Emphasis on 
Subprime Mortgage Performance 5 tbl.2 (Fed. Res. Bd., Working Paper, Aug. 27, 
2008), available at http://federalreserveonline.org/pdf/MF_Knowledge_Snapshot-0827 
08.pdf (prepared for Federal Reserve’s Home Mortgage Initiatives coordinating 
committee). 
 30. Id. (demonstrating that 24.2% of subprime borrowers had a credit score of 580 
or lower). 
 31. Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis:  Hearing Before the H. 
720 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
mortgages made up nearly 20% of the mortgage market, compared to 
 
Subprime borrowers paid significantly higher interest rates and sig-
nificantly higher fees than conforming or Alt-A borrowers.32  Because 
many of these borrowers were simply happy to be offered a mortgage, 
they were willing to accept very onerous terms.  It was not unusual to 
see loans made at a 10-11% annual percentage rate.  Mortgage brokers 
pocketed an additional 0.2% to 0.4% in fees at origination.33  In 
addition, many subprime mortgages were made to well-qualified 
speculators who were avoiding the normal rules in order to highly 
leverage the purchase of many homes and condominiums in the hope 
that they could be quickly “flipped” for an easy profit.34  People who 
could not qualify for conforming loans were given mortgages they likely 
could not and would not repay.  As lending practices became more lax, 
more loans were made with increasing risk.  In 2005, subprime 
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter 
Hearing] (statement of Frank L. Raiter, Managing Director and Head of Residential 
Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings Group, Standard and Poor’s, Mar. 1995-Apr. 
2005), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081022102804.pdf. 
 32. For example, 73% of subprime loans included a prepayment penalty with an 
average penalty of 30 months, Frame et al., supra note 29, at 3, while less than 2% of 
conventional borrowers accept such penalties.  Subprime Lending: Defining the Market 
and Its Customers:  Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity & 
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. 8-9 (2004) 
(prepared testimony of Eric Stein, Senior Vice President, Center for Responsible 
Lending), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/SteinStatement033004. 
pdf.  Interest rates on subprime loans average 8.62%; see, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 73 
Fed. Reg. 44,522-01, 44,542 (July 30, 2008); see Frame et al., supra note 29 at 5, table 
2.  Assuming a 30-year subprime purchase loan of $120,000 with a fixed interest rate of 
8.4% (versus the 8% rate the borrower likely would have received without a pre-
payment penalty), borrowers would pay more than $2,000 in additional interest over a 
five-year period if their loan included a prepayment penalty.  If held to maturity, 
borrowers would pay more than $12,000.  KEITH S. ERNST, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, BORROWERS GAIN NO INTEREST RATE BENEFITS FROM PREPAYMENT 
PENALTIES ON SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 5 (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.respon 
siblelending.org/pdfs/rr005-PPP_Interest_Rate-0105.pdf. 
 33. Subprime mortgage brokers earned commissions from 0.2% to 0.4% of each 
loan they originate, often earning several hundred thousand dollars per year in the 
process.  See Anders, supra note 2.  Based on this fee schedule, and the average 
subprime mortgage principal amount of $181,347, mortgage brokers earn a fee of 
between $363 to $725 on a typical loan.  See Frame et al., supra note 29, at 5 tbl.2; see 
also Gopi Mattel, supra note 24. 
 34. Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime 
Lending, 80(1) U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming Winter 2009). 
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less than 5% in 2001.35 
As of December 31, 2007, 17.4% of subprime loans were seriously 
delinquent and 47.1% were behind one payment or more according to 
Federal Reserve Board staff calculations.36  While the majority of these 
loans will likely avoid default,37 what many people misunderstood was 
exactly how bad subprime mortgages actually were.  For a large number 
of these mortgages, any rational person could have seen that the bor-
rower could barely, if at all, afford to pay even the initial monthly inter-
est payments on mortgage. 
D.  Predatory Lending 
Another group of mortgages, albeit not exactly a traditional cate-
gory under the U.S. standards, falls under the description of predatory 
lending.  Predatory lending involved using fraudulent tactics to induce a 
borrower to enter into a loan.38  Predatory lenders commonly failed to 
 
 35. Christopher J. Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and 
to Whom? 25 fig.1B (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Divs. of 
Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, NBER Working Paper No. 14083, June 
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200829/200829 
pap.pdf. 
 36. Frame et al., supra note 29, at 5 tbl.2. 
 37. The “only variable . . . that contributed substantially to the [subprime delin-
quency crisis] is the low subsequent house price appreciation for vintage 2006 and 2007 
loans, which can explain about a factor of 1.24 and 1.39, respectively, higher-than-
average likelihood for a current loan to turn delinquent.  Due to geographical hetero-
geneity in house price changes, some areas have experienced larger-than-average house 
price declines and therefore have a larger explained increase in delinquency and fore-
closure rates.”  Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis 2 (Working Paper, Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396.  The combined LTV ratio is believed to be 
the main determinant of delinquency, because it is the burden of all the debt together 
that may trigger financial problems for the borrower.  Id. at 3.  When the housing mar-
ket returns to normal, with moderately appreciating home values, even subprime mort-
gages should perform.  See also Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 34, at 25. 
 38. “Predatory lending depends on the inability of the borrower to understand the 
loan terms and the obligations associated with them.”  Giang Ho & Anthony 
Pennington-Cross, Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost of Credit 3 (Research Div., St. 
Louis Fed. Res., Working Paper No. 2006-022A, Apr. 2006), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-022.pdf.  Subprime loans were heavily 
concentrated in fast-growing parts of the country with considerable new construction, 
zip codes with more residents in the moderate credit score category and more black and 
Hispanic residents.  Areas with lower income and higher unemployment had more 
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fully disclose the terms of a loan, which included excessive fees and 
outrageous interest rates.39  For example, a predatory loan may have had 
a low, “teaser” interest rate for one month, which then readjusted in the 
second month to a far higher interest rate.  Many of these loans were 
used as a pretense to fraudulently acquire a person’s home.40  It was not 
unusual for a predatory lender to charge significant portions of the loan 
principal in upfront fees.41  Many states have enacted predatory lending 
laws, but they have proven difficult to enforce, as prosecuting attorneys 
do not have the resources to find and penalize those who engage in all 
but the most egregious of these lending practices.42 
E.  Adjustable Rate Mortgages 
Many people have blamed adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”) for 
a significant portion of the subprime mess.  These mortgages were part 
of the problem, but not as much as many people believe.  Used correctly, 
adjustable mortgages are not necessarily evil.  As long as the borrower 
fully understands the terms of the mortgage and plans accordingly, an 
adjustable rate mortgage can actually be quite useful to the borrower. 
ARMs differ from the more usual fixed rate mortgage in that the 
annual percentage rate (“APR”) charged as interest changes over the pe-
riod of the loan.43  In order to induce the borrower to enter into the loan, 
 
subprime lending, but these associations are smaller in magnitude.  See Mayer & Pence, 
supra note 35, at 2.  Predatory lenders typically target the poor and the elderly.   JAMES 
H. CARR, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, & LOPA KOLLURI, SENIOR CMTY. FIN. CONSULTANT, 
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION, PREDATORY LENDING:  AN OVERVIEW, FANNIE MAE 
FOUNDATION 2 (2001). 
 39. See CARR & KOLLURI, supra note 38, at 4. 
 40. Id.; see, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522-01, 44,542 (July 30, 
2008). 
 41. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data and FTC Lending Enforcement Before 
the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 110th 
Cong. § IV, pt. A. (2007) (statement of Lydia B. Parnes, Director, Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/ 
P064806hdma.pdf; see also CARR & KOLLURI, supra note 38, at 5 (noting the extreme 
example where a lender flipped a loan 11 times, attaching a 10 percent finance fee each 
time). 
 42. Baher Azmy, Squaring The Predatory Lending Circle: A Case For States as 
Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 301, 359-60 (2005). 
 43. See generally FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-
RATE MORTGAGES 6-10, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms 
brochure.pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER HANDBOOK]. 
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the introductory rate is typically set artificially low.  Then, after an intro-
ductory period of typically 5-10 years for conforming loans and 2 years 
for subprime loans,44 the interest rate begins to float and has to be regu-
larly readjusted.45  This rate adjustment is based on an index – such as 
the LIBOR or MTA – plus an additional margin above the rate of the 
index.46 
There are two potential traps created by ARMs which impacted 
borrowers.  First, the initial monthly payment may soon become far 
greater if interest rates rise.  The monthly payment, therefore, becomes 
absolutely dependent on market interests rates, the configuration of 
which is out of the borrower’s control, which makes financial planning 
difficult.  Second, since the low introductory interest rate was used to 
qualify the borrower for the loan,47 it was possible for borrowers to ob-
tain mortgages with monthly payments they could no longer afford after 
the introductory period.  Indeed, this is what happened as borrowers pur-
chased more expensive homes, assuming they would be able to re-
finance their ARMs before the introductory period expired. 
Although some ARMs are now going into default, the rate of such 
default is not catastrophic.48  More important to the determination of risk 
 44. In 2007, 35 out of every 100 loans at reset either defaulted or became 
delinquent within six months of the rate reset.  Presentation to the Florida Governor’s 
Florida Home Ownership Promotes the Economy (HOPE) Task Force, The Subprime 
Crisis: An Overview 12, 14-15 (Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.flgov.com/ 
pdfs/20080303presentation.pdf [hereinafter The Subprime Crisis: An Overview]; see 
also Frame et al., supra note 29, at 12-15 (noting the effect of a reset depends on 
whether the borrower can prepay the loan by either selling the house or refinancing and 
if they cannot prepay, what happens to the reference index rate). 
 45. See CONSUMER HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 7-9. 
 46. See id. at 8-9. 
 47. See Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 34, at 25 (arguing higher levels of default 
and foreclosure on hybrid or adjustable-rate loans reflect selection bias rather than flaws 
in the loan products themselves).  Up to 32 percent of loans with initial teaser rates 
eventually will default as a result of interest rate reset, but only 7 percent of market-rate 
adjustable loans will default due to reset.  Id. at 25 (citing CHRISTOPHER L. CAGAN, 
FIRST AM. CORE LOGIC, MORTGAGE PAYMENT RESET: THE ISSUE AND THE IMPACT 
(Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://www.facorelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Newsroom/ 
Studies_and_Briefs/Studies/20070048MortgagePaymentResetStudy_FINAL.pdf. Of 
subprime loans facing foreclosure, 36 percent are for hybrid loans, fixed-rate loans 
account for 31 percent, and adjustable-rate loans for 26 percent.  Id. at 25 (citing James 
R. Barth et al., Mortgage Market Turmoil: The Role of Interest-Rate Resets, SUBPRIME 
MARKET SERIES (Milken Inst., Santa Monica, C.A.) Dec. 2007). 
 48. Cumulative loss estimates on short-reset hybrid ARM (2/28 and 3/27) loans are 
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involved with mortgages is whether the income of the borrower was 
evaluated.  As Part III will explore, mortgages with no income verifi-
cation are at the greatest risk of default. 
III. CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM 
The mortgage debacle was driven by purchasers of residential 
mortgages entering into mortgages which they could not afford.49  This 
ultimately led to mortgage defaults and increased foreclosures.  In addi-
tion, the mortgages were often made under the flawed assumption that 
property values would continue to rise substantially and immediately, 
resulting in mortgages with balances exceeding the values of the proper-
ties.50  This condition is referred to as being “under water,” or “upside 
down” on one’s mortgage.51  In a traditional debt analysis, there are two 
safety features.  First, the borrower should have the proven capability to 
pay.  Second, the secured property should have sufficient value to satisfy 
the debt.  If these conditions are met, defaults on loans are very rare.52  
Both of these conditions, nevertheless, were ignored, fueling an explo-
sion of defaults.53 
As prices declined, people who had borrowed a high percentage of 
their purchase price had a lesser incentive to struggle to make their 
5.25% for 2005 and 6.75% for 2006, with 80% of cumulative loss projections between 
1.75% and 8.75% for 2005 and between 3.90% and 11.25% for 2006.  Scott Davey & 
Matthew Keenen, Revised Default and Loss Curves for U.S. Alt-A RMBS Transactions, 
RATINGSDIRECT (Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 19, 2007, at 6, available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Dec%2019%20Alt-A%20method 
ology.pdf. 
 49. The standard for how much total debt and housing expenses certain borrowers 
can carry rose from 38% to 45% of their income in some markets.  See Simon, supra 
note 6. 
 50. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 37, at 1-9. 
 51. David Leonhardt, Life Preserver for Owners Under Water, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2008, at B1. 
 52. Two decades of economic buoyancy gave lenders the confidence to believe 
such security measures were no longer necessary.  As former Fed Chairman Alan 
Greenspan told Congress in October 2008, “[t]he whole intellectual edifice . . . 
collapsed in the summer of [2007], because the data inputted into the risk management 
models generally covered only the past two decades, a period of euphoria.”  Hearing, 
supra note 31, at 18-19 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 1987-2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 
1024163819.pdf; see also The Subprime Crisis:  An Overview, supra note 44, at 13. 
 53. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 37. 
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payments.  If the mortgage had an adjustable rate, the payment was 
increasing.54  The result was defaults and foreclosures of record propor-
tions.  Because the properties no longer had sufficient value to repay the 
mortgage upon a sale in foreclosure, lenders and investors suffered a 
loss.  Because the lender sold the mortgage to a third party, the third 
party had an asset which had decreased in value.55 
Although the government stepped in to alleviate the problem, it was 
already too late.  A laissez-faire attitude toward mortgage lending crea-
ted a feeding frenzy by all parties involved.  Borrowers took out loans 
that went into foreclosure.  Lenders made bad mortgages that went into 
default.56  Investment banks pooled mortgages and sold them to invest-
ors, leading investors to believe their investments were far more secure 
than they were.  And to make matters come full circle, investment banks 
also lent money to purchasers of these poor securities, suffering losses 
when these purchasers could not repay their debts to the banks.  The 
people who made money on these transactions – the so-called mortgage 
brokers – took their money and are now out of the picture.  Many are 
currently employed in other endeavors.  If the government had reacted 
earlier, or regulated correctly in the first place, most of the losses could 
have been avoided. 
Ultimately, the subprime mortgage crisis is a failure of response-
bility at every level: borrowers, lenders, investment banks, appraisers, 
rating agencies, investors, and undoubtedly, the regulators.  In the rush 
to follow greed at every level, all the normal protections broke down. 
 54. See id. 
 55. “The foreclosure crises [sic] is basically the result of the decline in prices of 
homes,” Greenspan told Congress.  “[B]efore we had all of the securitization . . . most 
of the loans were made by savings and loans, when the borrower got into trouble, the 
holder of the mortgage recognized that if foreclosure occurred that he would lose as 
well.”  Hearing, supra note 31, at 133 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 1987-2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/docu 
ments/20081024163819.pdf. 
 56. Subprime lenders New Century Financial Corp. and Fremont General Corp. 
filed for bankruptcy protection in April 2007 and June 2008, respectively.  Tiffany 
Kary, Fremont Files Bankruptcy After CapitalSource Sale, BLOOMBERG, June 18, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601208&sid=aTXnk2vnT0NA&refer=fi
nance.  In 2004, New Century earned $800.6 million from sale of loans.  New Century 
Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 55 (Mar. 16, 2006); see also Victoria 
Wagner & John K Bartko, Subprime Mortgage Lenders: Transition in a Stressed 
Mortgage Cycle, RATINGSDIRECT (Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 27, 2007, 
at pt.6. 
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A.  Mortgage Market Gone Wild 
A significant cause of the increase in foreclosures and bad mort-
gages was the consumer; the person who either did not understand, 
underestimated or ignored the risks involved in getting a mortgage.  
There were some instances of sheer fraud in inducing consumers to 
obtain very poor mortgages, called predatory lending,57 but the vast 
majority of nonperforming loans were simply made to people who could 
not afford them, and should have been informed of that fact.  Many 
people were caught up in the belief that real estate was an investment 
that would consistently provide guaranteed returns.58  People believed 
that they could not lose if they bought a home.  The government proudly 
crowed at the increasing percentage of homeownership of U.S. 
citizens.59  In many places the expectation that property would continue 
to increase in value fueled a frenzy of buying.  This belief encouraged 
people to incur risks well beyond their normal comfort range.  It also 
persuaded some people to engage in risky purchases with the expec-
tation of profits.  As people saw their friends make money in real estate, 
they made copycat decisions to enter this lucrative investment field.  
Profits earned, of course, lured more people into the real estate market.  
True home buyers and speculators driven by the dream of easy profits 
agreed to take on such high closing costs and interest rates that even the 
most aggressive lenders must have had to pause and to wonder, at least 
momentarily: ‘Is this really happening?’  All the while, the unprece-
dented demand created a juicy flow of cash upon which the mortgage 
brokers gorged themselves. 
Speculators in many of the hottest markets used subprime loans to 
finance their pursuit of a quick profit.60  In some instances, a person 
 
 57. See Azmy, supra note 42, at 299-300. 
 58. “Of course, over the past 25 years we have seen numerous real estate busts,” 
argued Neil Barsky, managing partner of Alson Capital Partners, LLC in the summer of 
2005 in an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal.  “What we have never seen in this country 
is a collapse of home prices without also seeing local economic weakness or significant 
capacity growth.  Absent those factors, housing markets just don’t collapse under their 
own weight.  Herewith are some of the myths put forth by the housing bubble Chicken 
Littles.”  Neil Barsky, What Housing Bubble?, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2005, at A10. 
 59. Edwin Chen, Bush, in Pennsylvania, Hails Record Homeownership, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at A30.  (The home ownership rate in the U.S. rose to a record 
68.6%); see also David Streitfeld & Gretchen Morgenson, Building Flawed American 
Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1. 
 60. Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 34, at 30. 
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either made a profit themselves in the rapidly rising real estate market or 
saw a friend make an easy profit.  These speculators would use 100% 
financed subprime mortgages and buy multiple houses or condominiums 
and then default on the mortgage when the real estate market turned 
down.  A speculator could obtain these mortgages without income or 
asset verification.  The belief was that the mortgage would be paid off in 
a short time, when the property was “flipped” for a quick profit.  Real 
estate brokers encouraged these tactics to stimulate their business and 
directed the buyers to compliant lenders who paid large commissions.61  
In addition, the lack of required documentation induced many people to 
buy properties for inflated prices and pay off involved parties.  They 
were defrauding the lenders and had no intention of ever repaying the 
loan.62  The ease with which anyone could get large sums of money 
brought about a large number of fraudulent schemes.63  This speculation 
helped to drive up prices in the hottest real estate markets and conse-
quently led to their rapid fall when the properties went into default. 
1.  A Short Note on the History and Development  
of Subprime Mortgages 
Like many ideas which begin with a commendable premise and end 
with disaster, the evolution of subprime mortgages is sprinkled with 
abundant good intentions.  In the 1970s, the U.S. government embarked 
upon programs which would encourage home ownership among 
minority groups.  The Community Reinvestment Act, enacted in 1977, 
required that all banking institutions be evaluated to determine if they 
were adequately meeting the credit needs of their local community.64  
This Act did not provide specific criteria for the evaluation, but directed 
that the evaluation should accommodate the situation and context of 
each institution.  The Act did not require that an institution make high-
risk loans.  The goal was to encourage minority participation in the 
 61. Anthony Effinger, Fear & Foreclosure in Las Vegas, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/marketsmag/mm_1208_story2.html. 
 62. Ryan Mills, FBI Arrests Two in Nationwide Real Estate Scam Involving Collier 
Homes, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Oct. 17, 2008, at A1 (noting indictments of people using 
subprime, non-document loans to obtain mortgages, and to illegally profit from the 
proceeds). 
 63. See Eric Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1 (noting that the FBI does not have the resources to 
pursue the large number of mortgage fraud cases which have arisen since 2004). 
 64. The Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (1977). 
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American dream of homeownership.65  This goal continued through the 
Clinton administration and into the George W. Bush years.66 
Reducing the down payment required of a purchaser and offering 
mortgages to persons with lower than previous credit standards was in-
tended to broaden the pool of mortgage borrowers; it was believed that 
by allowing more people into homeownership, household wealth would 
increase.  More people could build equity in their home and could 
realize an increase in wealth from the rising asset values.67  Subprime 
mortgages were meant to provide an opportunity for homeownership to 
those who could not previously qualify for a mortgage.68  Subprime 
mortgages were initially concentrated in minority neighborhoods and 
neighborhoods with weaker economic conditions.69 
From the onset of the subprime mortgage lending program, it was 
recognized that default rates would be higher than those experienced in 
the conforming mortgage market.  In fact, it was expected that the de-
fault rates would be much higher.70  Delinquency rates on subprime 
mortgages in 2002 were reported to be 5.5 times higher than for prime 
mortgages.71  The higher fees and higher interest rates charged on sub-
prime mortgage loans were thought to adequately compensate lenders 
for the increased risk.  The subprime lenders set the interest rates based 
upon loan grades.  The lower the grade, the higher the interest rate 
charged.  The grades were based upon the borrower’s credit score and 
 65. See generally Amy E. Hillier, Spatial Analysis of Historical Redlining:  A 
Methodological Exploration, 14(1) J. HOUSING RES. 137-67 (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=cplan_papers. 
 66. See Jo Becker et al., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A1. 
 67. “Homeownership is one of the primary ways that households can build wealth.”  
Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the 
Subprime Mortgage Market, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 31 (Jan./Feb. 2006). 
 68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08. 
 69. See Paul S. Calem et al., The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Lending, 
29(4) J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 407 (2004). 
 70. See Dennis R. Capozza & Thomas A. Thomson, 33 J. REAL EST. FIN. ECON. 
241, 244 (2006), available at http://faculty.business.utsa.edu/tthomson/papers/Capozza 
ThomsonDefTransitions_20July2005.pdf. 
 71. The rate of “serious delinquency,” defined as in foreclosure status or ninety or 
more days delinquent, was 1.12 percent for prime mortgages and 7.36 percent for 
subprime in 2003.  Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Subprime 
Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges, Remarks Before the Financial 
Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Meeting (May 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040521/default.htm#. 
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the amount of his or her down payment.  As the subprime wave grew, 
the grade standards were lowered to allow more people into the mort-
gage market.72  The number of subprime loans grew dramatically from 
1995 through 2006, as did the securitization of mortgages, especially of 
subprime loans.73 
Before 1980, it was not possible to charge high rates on mortgages.  
That changed, however, with the passage of the Depositary Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (“DIDMCA”), which allowed 
higher interest rates.74  The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity 
Act, enacted in 1982, allowed lenders to offer adjustable rate mortgages 
and to use balloon payments.75  The lasting effect of these laws was to 
set the groundwork for subprime mortgages. 
The freeing up of mortgage lenders, the encouragement for lenders 
to make more risky loans, and the development of the MBS market were 
the key factors leading to the creation of the huge subprime mortgage 
market, which collapsed in 2006.76  Loans were made to people with 
poor credit and who were required to invest less and less on a down 
payment.  Add to the mix the lenders’ increasingly easy access to funds 
to be lent from eager securitizers of mortgage loans, and the recipe for 
disaster is complete.  Ultimately, lenders were simply giving large 
amounts of money to anyone who applied for a loan.  Credit was not 
checked.  Income was not checked.  Appraisals were either falsified or 
ignored. 
B.  Personal Responsibility of the Home Owners 
Many have argued that a free market lending system works well, 
forcing those who make mistakes to suffer the consequences.  The 
Federal Reserve Board took a hands-off stance with respect to regulating 
lenders and their loan standards.77  Encouraging homeownership among 
 
 72. Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross supra note 67, at 35. 
 73. Id. at 37. 
 74. 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1980). 
 75. Id. §§ 3801 (1982) et. seq. 
 76. Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 77. “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifi-
cally banks and others, were such is that they were best capable of protecting their own 
shareholders and their equity in the firms,” Greenspan acknowledged in his recent 
Congressional testimony.  “[I]t’s been my experience, having worked both as a 
regulator for 18 years and similar quantities, in the private sector, especially, 10 years at 
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those who had previously been precluded from the mortgage market was 
considered good social policy.78  While a free market system is believed 
to punish those who make bad decisions, this theory presupposes that 
responsibility follows bad decisions.  The disconnect between decision-
making and responsibility which arose in the subprime lending market 
resulted in some people making a lot of money without bearing any 
responsibility. 
The social and moral question centers around who should determine 
that a particular borrower cannot afford to pay the proposed mortgage.  
If the lender would suffer from a default, the lender should be inclined to 
refuse to make a mortgage loan.  But since the lender could sell the bad 
loan to eager investors, the lender suffers no consequences from bad 
loans.  The federal government did not caution borrowers in any way, 
nor did it provide roadblocks from unscrupulous lenders.  Borrowers 
must be adequately informed with respect to any new mortgage, and 
they must be either counseled about bad decisions or simply prohibited 
from making them. 
Some borrowers just did not understand the costs of their mortgage.  
Lured into adjustable mortgages with attractive “teaser” interest rates, 
these borrowers found that they made a mistake in borrowing these 
funds.  Partly to blame is a lack of popular understanding or education 
about borrowing.  Another culprit may be their lawyer’s inability or 
unwillingness to explain the possibility and consequences of later 
default.  Although many lawyers do not believe that they have a duty to 
counsel their home buyer clients with respect to their ability to afford the 
proposed mortgage, it would seem that lawyers need to take a more 
proactive position.  Either the lawyer or a paralegal should review the 
a major international bank, that the loan officers of those [private] institutions knew far 
more about the risks involved and the people to whom they lent money, than I saw even 
our best regulators at the Fed capable of doing.”  Hearing, supra note 31, at 33-34 
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 1987-
2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081024163819.pdf. 
 78. “[T]he plight of people who do not have adequate rental housing ought to be 
addressed,” wrote House Financial Services Committee Chairman, Rep. Barney Frank 
(D-Mass.), explaining the social policy reasons to support federal support for 
homeownership.  Barney Frank, Letter to the Editor, I’ve Long Been a Champion of 
Fannie/Freddie Reform, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A26; see also James R. 
Hagerty, Fannie, Freddie Share Spotlight in Mortgage Mess, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 
2008, at A6.  Others saw this as a politically expedient justification for the existence 
and growth of government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Paul 
Gigot, The Fannie Mae Gang, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2008, at A17. 
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financial information of the buyer and give a written analysis of the risk 
that the buyer cannot pay the mortgage.  It should become an ethical 
duty for a lawyer to properly counsel their clients about the terms of 
their mortgage.  For an attorney to sit by idly and watch a client pay 
excessive fees or other charges is simply not acceptable.  Borrowers who 
are forced into foreclosure and suffer losses will seek defendants for 
lawsuits.  Lawyers, who maintain malpractice insurance, are therefore 
likely targets.  Both for the sake of their clients and to protect 
themselves from later lawsuits, lawyers should give their at-risk clients 
some financial counseling. 
Any decision to incur debt depends upon the information available 
and the risk analysis made by the borrower.  These credit decisions can 
be divided into three categories.79 
1. Rational Decisions 
A rational decision is made under circumstances where the debtor 
has all necessary information.  Most rational credit decisions generate 
good results, subject to market conditions.  The most important factor in 
a rational decision making process is the borrower’s ability to pay back 
the loan.  Due consideration should be given to the advice of qualified 
and disinterested (not compensated based on the outcome of the deci-
sion) financial advisors.  Such advice must become part of the mortgage 
process. 
2.  Irrational Decisions 
Some debtors make irrational decisions based on an incorrect risk 
analysis or simply due to poor decision-making, even if they have access 
to all relevant information.  More likely, these debtors lack sufficient 
financial knowledge, capabilities and competent financial advice.  Our 
society does not seem to value financial ability and has allowed too 
many people to make bad decisions.  The availability of credit has lured 
millions into debt which they cannot pay.  Although the credit industry 
has thrived on luring people into making bad financial decisions, some 
protection is needed in the mortgage market.  Those who make irrational 
decisions on their face must be warned of the consequences.  While it is 
 79. See Vincent Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury:  An Argument for Legal Controls 
on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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not practicable to intervene in every credit card purchase, it is possible 
to intervene in bad mortgage decisions.  If the loan is a high interest loan 
or is clearly outside of the person’s ability to repay the loan, such inter-
vention should be required. 
3.  Irresponsible Decisions 
Some debtors will make a credit decision based upon insufficient 
information, or they may be indifferent to the information available.  
When markets are rising rapidly, a certain number of borrowers will 
make “greed”-based decisions.  These are the speculators who do not 
process available information in a rational manner.80  When speculators 
see people making money in real estate, the assumption of excessive risk 
becomes acceptable to them because of their nature.  The role of specu-
lation in the real estate market has always been significant.  At what 
point should the government deter speculators?  It would seem that some 
controls are necessary when speculators threaten the viability of rational 
markets and the financial well-being of others.  Speculation has always 
been a part of the economic system, softened by the availability of bank-
ruptcy.  However, when speculation threatens the viability of entire 
neighborhoods, it is probably better to reign it in before the damage is 
done. Lenders must be especially careful when extending credit to 
speculators and should be required to “tag” these loans accordingly. 
Prospective investors in mortgage backed securities should be alerted to 
the increased risk associated with securities which include loans to 
speculators. 
There is also the possibility that available information is incompre-
hensible.  The extension of credit and the regulation of credit products 
should be designed to protect borrowers and lenders from these cate-
gories of credit decision makers.  Those making rational decisions need 
as much information as possible.  Some people need financial advice 
before making a major decision.  Others simply will not be deterred by 
any advice or warnings, although they should be. 
 80. See, e.g., Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage 
Broker-Borrower Relationship:  A Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending 
Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (2005) (describing “information 
asymmetry,” which analyzes the situation where the lender has more information than 
the borrower). 
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D.  Lenders 
Probably the biggest disconnect in our mortgage system, which led 
to the subprime debacle, was the explosion of lenders who entered the 
housing market.81  Historically, home mortgages were given almost ex-
clusively by savings and loan associations and banks.  Mortgage brokers 
were people who helped individual buyers find the best deal on a 
mortgage.  These things changed dramatically during the bubble.  Mort-
gage banks, many employing brokers of their own, started providing the 
mortgages to borrowers, then selling the mortgages thereafter in bulk to 
banks.82  Numerous mortgage companies sprang up.  Countrywide 
Mortgage, a dedicated mortgage company, became the largest nation-
wide lender,83 displacing the traditional banks.  The profits to be made 
on more expensive mortgages led to a rapid, unregulated expansion of 
the types of lenders and loans available to a borrower. 
 
 81. Subprime lender New Century told its shareholders the firm faced “intense 
competition” from other mortgage banking companies, consumer finance companies, 
commercial banks, credit unions, thrift institutions, credit card issuers, insurance 
finance companies, Internet-based lending companies and other large financial insti-
tutions.  “The intense competition in the mortgage industry has led to rapid techno-
logical developments, evolving industry standards and frequent releases of new prod-
ucts and enhancements.”  New Century Financial Corp., Annual Report, supra note 56.  
The boom was also fueled by traditionally conservative lenders, which jumped into the 
fray by delving into riskier products: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. began allowing some of 
its customers to take out home-equity loans and lines of credit without having their 
incomes verified; Wells Fargo & Co. began allowing buyers of investment properties in 
some parts of the country to take out interest-only mortgages; and Washington Mutual 
Inc. began offering home-equity lines of credit to borrowers who buy condominium 
units as an investment or as a second home and let borrowers who buy a second home 
or investment property finance as much as 90% of the home’s value, up from 75%.  See 
Simon, supra note 6. 
 82. See The Subprime Crisis: An Overview, supra note 44, at 18-20.  Sometimes 
these mortgage backed securities were then repackaged again, split up into tranches and 
securitized again as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), with global CDO issuance 
exploding from $85 billion in 2002 to $549 billion in 2006.  Id. at 20.  Securitization 
was especially prevalent among subprime mortgage lenders.  New Century, for 
example, funded its operations loan sales and securitizations structured as sales.  
Interestingly, the firm began reversing course in 2003, retaining a portion of its loan 
production on its balance sheet “for investment,” extracting liquidity from its holdings 
by structuring securitization as financings rather than sales.  New Century Financial 
Corp., Annual Report, supra note 56. 
 83. Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
26, 2007, § 3, at 1. 
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The brokers connecting borrowers with these new lenders created a 
new form of a “boiler room,” not focusing on stocks, but rather selling a 
new menu of mortgages.84  Quick fortunes were made because poorly 
qualified borrowers were willing to pay excessive interest rates and 
transaction fees.  Mortgage brokers earned excessive commissions by 
bringing these unqualified borrowers to mortgage banks.  The higher the 
transaction costs and interest the borrowers were willing to pay, the 
higher the commission the broker stood to earn.85 
This would not have been possible without the concurrent explosion 
of the MBS market, which allowed lenders to package their loans and 
sell them to investors, thereby creating more cash to make more loans.  
Since the mortgages were sold, the lender did not retain any liability for 
nonpayment of the mortgages.86  There was a disconnect between the 
people making the lending decision, and the people ultimately bearing 
the risk of default.  This disconnect allowed lenders to make loans seem-
ingly without any consideration of the consequences.87  No income veri-
fication, no appraisal, no credit check, so what?88  Conservative lending 
institutions which did not lower their lending standards did not see ex-
cessive defaults in their mortgages.89  A clear lesson from the mortgage 
debacle is that lenders must adhere to proven standards in making loans.  
If those standards are not met and the loan is made anyway, then such a 
poor loan needs to be designated clearly when sold as an MBS.  These 
loans should not be packaged and securitized together with stronger 
loans. 
E. Securitization of Mortgage Backed Securities 
Mortgage debt has been sold to investors since 1938 when Fannie 
Mae was created.90  The government sought to enhance liquidity in the 
 
 84. Gretchen Morgenson, Was There a Loan It Didn’t Like, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2008, § BU, at 1.  “At WaMu it wasn’t about the quality of the loans:  it was about the 
numbers.”  Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Dequity:  The Blurring of Debt and Equity 
in Securitized Real Estate Financing, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 233 (2005). 
 87. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 6. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See, e.g., Peter Beller, Hudson City Bancorp:  Bland is Beautiful, FORBES, Dec. 
20, 2007, available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/20/best-managed-banking-biz-
cz_pb_08platinum_1220hudson.html. 
 90. National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1938), 12 U.S.C. § 1716, tit. III, et seq. 
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market for home loans by providing a vehicle in which mortgages could 
be packaged by lenders into mortgage backed securities, freeing up 
funds for new mortgage lending and expanding the pool of credit avail-
able to prospective homebuyers.  This process has fostered home owner-
ship.  The central reason it worked, however, was the establishment of 
well-defined lending standards by the government-sponsored enter-
prises, such as Fannie Mae.91  Because the GSEs bought conforming 
mortgages, banks interested in tapping the GSE-supported liquid market 
for conforming mortgage backed securities had to adhere to the GSE’s 
rigorous underwriting criteria.  Historically, loan defaults were very rare 
and buying these securities as an investment was a very conservative 
investment decision.92  Investors came to know that purchasing pack-
aged mortgages brought a nice, secure return on investment. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, creative investment bankers began to 
develop more complex, sophisticated securities backed by mortgages.93  
 91. See supra note 16. 
 92. See Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing 
“favorable yields, good liquidity and a high degree of safety” as the reason for insti-
tutional investor interest in mortgage backed securities), vacating as moot 459 U.S. 
1026 (1982); see also Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 
1996) (finding “[a] reasonable investor could not have read the prospectuses without 
realizing that, despite the use of balancing in an attempt to minimize the impact of 
fluctuating interest rates, a significant downturn in interest rates could decrease the 
value” of the mortgage backed securities in a trust with both interest-only strips (IOs) of 
mortgages, which tend to go up with interest rates, and mortgage-backed securities, 
which tend to go down when interest rates go up); Hurst v. Crosby, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24755, at *3-4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2006) (citing “the possibility of high return” 
despite “high risk” as the reason for investor interest).  Contra Banca Cremi, S.A. v. 
Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1022 (4th Cir. Md. 1997) (noting 
“historically, investments in fixed-rate home mortgages have not been attractive to 
institutional investors,” because “mortgages perform poorly both when interest rates 
rise and when they fall”). 
 93. The first private asset-backed security was issued by Bank of America in 1977.  
It consisted of a simple pass-through structure, with only one tranche.  Once investors 
became comfortable with MBS and predicting mortgage performance, the securities 
became substantially more complex.  Mason & Rosner, supra note 2, at 20.  Exotic 
hedges and a global marketplace emerged almost immediately thereafter.  Then, as now, 
a shadow market with undisclosed obligations and uncertain rules sewed litigation and 
confusion in times of economic distress.  In one illustrative 1978 transaction, for 
example, a Texas credit union purchased a hedge against the possibility of falling 
interest rates on a Government National Mortgage Association bond from a Tennessee 
securities trading firm, which immediately entered into another hedge on the same 
instrument with an Argentinean bank.  See LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov’t Sec., 
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For a world searching for the greatest return on investment, without un-
derstanding the risks involved, these new MBS became the hottest rage.  
The MBS market became the most active market in the world, surpass-
ing even the New York Stock Exchange.94  The market for MBS in the 
Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aff’d 704 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983).  By the 
early 1980s, a robust futures market for mortgage securities emerged.  Lenders 
employed these instruments in ways that made mortgage markets more efficient, such 
as hedging against the possibility of falling interest rates between the date an issuer 
makes a firm commitment to extend credit to a homebuilder and the date the securities 
are actually issued.  See Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov’t Sec., Inc., 737 F.2d 582, 584 
(7th Cir. 1984) (noting “issuers generally sell GNMA forward contracts to broker-
dealers . . . who in turn enter into contracts for forward delivery with investors . . . . 
Because GNMA’s (GNMA ‘actuals’) and GNMA forward contracts are fully trans-
ferable from one investor to another, markets for these instruments have evolved, and 
their value may vary.”).  In the 1990’s a market for derivative instruments emerged.  
See In re TCW/DW North Am. Gov’t Income Trust Secs. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18485, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1997) (noting “[m]ortgage-backed securities have 
become increasingly complicated financial products, and now include among their 
number several mortgage derivative securities.”).  By the beginning of the present 
decade, borrowers learned how to leverage the liquidity afforded by this market to their 
advantage.  The Subprime Crisis:  An Overview, supra note 44, at 13.  In 2005, the 
majority of subprime ABS was bought by another securitization vehicle that issued 
further bonds.  Id. at 20. 
 94. Trading of residential mortgages and related debt overshadowed trading in the 
stock market in 1985, after quadrupling to $2 trillion between 1981 and 1986.  During 
this period MBS instruments became more complex, as mortgage-backed agency debt’s 
share of the market declined from 42.5% in 1981 to 28.5% in 1986, while volume in 
pass-through mortgage securities rose from 48.6% to 61.4% during the same period.  
Robert Guenther, Mortgage-Exchange Proposal Is Studied:  Heavy Trading Volume 
Strains Current System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1986.  Increased volume has not 
necessarily enhanced liquidity, however, especially for subprime mortgage debt.  In 
2005, a London firm launched an index, the ABX, which tracks a basket of 20 subprime 
MBS with an original value of $28 billion.  Traders rely on the relatively small $3 to $4 
billion in trading volume on the ABX to price subprime securities in an overall market 
valued at approximately $1 trillion.  By comparison, there is a $179 billion average 
daily trading volume in S&P 500 index futures and options contracts on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange.  Serena Ng, et al., A ‘Subprime’ Gauge, in Many Ways? – ABX, 
Warts and All, Is ‘Only Game in Town’, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2007, at C1.  Some of 
the strain falls on the even more opaque market for “credit-default swaps.”  The 
“notional” values of outstanding CDS soared from $34.5 trillion at the end of 2006 to 
$45.5 trillion in 2007, a 37% jump.  A CDS represents a promise by one firm to make 
regular payments to another firm, if a specified bond or loan defaults.  Investors use 
these swaps for both hedging and speculating.  Serena Ng, Default Swaps:  One Boom 
in the Crunch – Volume Soared in ‘07 as Woes Worsened, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, 
at C2. 
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United States grew from $639 Billion in 1995 to $3.3 Trillion in 2005.95  
In order to feed the growing appetite for these investments, eager invest-
ment bankers created newer and more complex investment instru-
ments.96  Mortgages extended to creditworthy borrowers were pooled 
alongside mortgages with more uncertain payment prospects and pack-
aged as mortgage backed securities.  These packages included prime, 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages in groups of 1000 to 25,000 mortgages.97  
Some high quality, low risk mortgages were packaged with higher risk 
mortgages, promising a higher rate of return.  As demand for mortgages 
and MBSs increased, the banks responded by packaging increasingly 
risky mortgages and selling them to unwary investors. 
When a bank makes a loan, it may hold that loan on its books or 
sell the loan to a trust or other Special Purpose Entity (“SPE”, some-
times also called Special Purpose Vehicle or “SPV”).98  These loans are 
bundled together and turned into a security, which is owned by the SPE 
and then sold to investors.99  Through this securitization, the investors 
have the beneficial interest in the loans while the bank retains some 
 95. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Frank L. Raiter, Managing Director and 
Head of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings Group, Standard and Poor’s, 
Mar. 1995-Apr. 2005), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200810221 
02804.pdf. 
 96. See generally Andrew Kelman, Mortgage-backed Securities & Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations: Prudent CRA INVESTMENT Opportunities, CMTY. INVS. (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, C.A.), Mar. 2002, at 20, 22-23, 
available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/investments/cra02-2/mbs.pdf  
(touting “the innovative and complex CMO structure [which] enables banks to leverage 
investment in affordable housing from non-CRA regulated institutions, since the long 
cash flows are sold to pension funds and insurance companies”). 
 97. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Frank L. Raiter, Managing Director and 
Head of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings Group, Standard and Poor’s, 
Mar. 1995-Apr. 2005), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200810221 
02804.pdf . 
 98. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 133, 135 (1994).  Originators find it desirable to transfer loans to a newly formed 
special purpose corporation, trust, or other legally separate entity (often referred to as a 
special purpose vehicle, or “SPV”) to separate the receivables from risks associated 
with the originator.  Id. 
 99. In order to attract investors and reassure credit risk insurers, an originator must 
or forego its right to the residual value of the receivables sold to a SPE.  Id. at 141.  Tax 
and accounting rules require the originator inject a minimum level of capital into the 
SPE, typically 1% to 3% of the amount securities issued, to legally shift the liabilities 
associated with the loans from the originator to the SPE.  Id. at 138.  Investors then 
assume the risks associated with servicing and collecting the receivables.  Id. at 151. 
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residual interest, or possibly some of the beneficial interest.100  The 
structure of a loan securitization involves a trust agreement between the 
bank and the SPE specifically defining the duties and obligations of the 
SPE.101  The parties also execute a transfer and servicing agreement bet-
ween the bank and the SPE, whereby the bank agrees to collect and 
distribute the payments on the mortgages after the sale of the mortgages 
to the SPE.102  Other entities and agreements are used to ensure that each 
investor is paid the correct amount based on the incoming payment 
stream on the underlying mortgages. This securitization process pro-
vides an inexpensive and efficient method to finance new loans.103  In 
theory, it also takes loans off the balance sheet of the originating bank 
and shields them from defaults. 
F.  Investors 
One of the credos of investing in securities is that you should not 
invest in anything you do not understand.  Many investors, even sophis-
ticated investors and professional money managers, did not understand 
the complex MBSs created by the investment bankers and did not under-
stand the risks involved with purchasing these investments.  The CRAs 
provided little help because their ratings did not adequately convey the 
 
 100. Id. at 141. 
 101. “The single-purpose entity is a hallmark of securitized lending, and conduit 
loan documents usually contain detailed requirements for the borrower’s structure,” 
specifying which entity or entities must be SPEs and what provisions must be contained 
in their organizational documents.  Lenders typically require the provisions of the SPE 
match the conduit loan documents verbatim.  Lisa Connolly, et al., Debt Transfer:  
Loan Assumptions Provide a Funding Source During Challenging Economic Times, 
COM. INV. REAL EST. MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2008, available at http://www.ciremagazine. 
com/article.php?article_id=1297. 
 102. Pools of securitized loans are serviced pursuant to pooling and servicing 
agreements, with day-to-day loan issues managed by one or more servicers.  The com-
mon division of loan servicing responsibilities is often between a master servicer and a 
special servicer.  Master servicers generally service loans that are not in default, while 
special servicers handle loans in default.  Id. 
 103. See ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW 
YORK, STAFF REPORT: UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
CREDIT 39 (Mar. 2008).  Securitization enables originators to obtain low cost, off 
balance sheet, capital market funding.  Schwarcz suggests the use of securitization by 
investment grade companies is evidence of the value of securitization, noting “profit 
maximizing companies generally do not engage in activities whose benefits are 
illusory.”  Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 146. 
2009 RESPONDING TO THE SUBPRIME MESS: 739 
 THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
 
risk involved with these investments.104  Investors simply did not grasp 
the poor quality of the mortgages which were being made. 
Agencies charged with rating these securities made significant er-
rors in their rating schemes.105  CRAs are paid by the issuers, who have 
a significant incentive to increase the rating.106  The CRAs saw little 
duty to the investors who were relying on the ratings.  In any case, the 
CRAs made mistakes.  Either the bankers lied or misled them, or the 
CRAs simply did a poor job in their due diligence.107  Many of these 
 104. Institutional investors rely on CRAs to maintain the credit quality of their 
investments.  A bond fund’s investments typically range in quality from securities rated 
in the lowest category in which the fund is permitted to invest to securities rated in the 
highest category “as rated by Moody’s, S&P or Fitch, or, if unrated, determined . . . to 
be of comparable quality.”  PIMCO TOTAL RETURN FUND PROSPECTUS (share class P) 
app. at A1 (Sept. 1, 2008). The PIMCO Total Return Fund, for example, invests for 
“maximum total return consistent with preservation of capital and prudent investment 
management” by investing in bonds with credit ratings from B to Aaa, and is restricted 
to a maximum of 10% of total assets below Baa.  Id. at 5.  The Reserve Primary Fund 
seeks to maintain suitability for investors who desire “greater security and liquidity than 
other types of investments” without “as high a rate of return,” by investing in “securities 
rated in one of the two highest short-term ratings, generally by two of the nationally 
recognized” CRAs.  RESERVE LIQUID PERFORMANCE MONEY MARKET FUND 
PROSPECTUS 3-4 (Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter RESERVE PROSPECTUS]. 
 105. “[T]he data inputted into the risk management models generally covered only 
the past two decades, a period of euphoria,” Greenspan told Congress.  Hearing, supra 
note 31, at 18-19 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 1987-2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081024 
163819.pdf.  While CRAs awarded the “gold standard” AAA rating to an elite group of 
approximately 12 blue-chip corporations as of the fall of 2007, more than half of the 
mortgage bond debt outstanding  (by value) were rated AAA.  Some of these bonds 
were “backed by risky subprime loans.”  To facilitate this rating investment banks 
“deliberately fashion some bonds to pay higher yields – but also to absorb any losses 
first,” from a large pool of loans, divided according to credit risk and interest rate yield, 
so up to 30% of the loans in a pool would need to go bad before a AAA-rated bond 
would take a loss.  Unfortunately, these projections did not pan out and in August 2007 
Standard & Poor’s lowered the rating on two hard-hit structured vehicles from AAA to 
CC.  Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Triple-A Ratings Grade on a Curve, Making It 
Difficult to Assess Risk, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2007, at B1. 
 106. See Lucchetti, supra note 9. 
 107. Id.  Originators claiming the ability to reasonably predict the aggregate rate of 
default have been able to securitize receivables with a substantial risk of uncollectibility 
for over a decade, a phenomenon Schwarcz discussed in his 1994 article, but the ability 
to accurately assess the risk of nonpayment is an important factor in valuing such 
receivables.  See Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 135.  Investors rely on CRAs to perform 
this evaluative function. 
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rated securities were given bond ratings which far exceeded their actual 
value.108  State investment funds, pension funds, hedge funds, invest-
ment banks – all of these supposedly sophisticated investors – were 
purchasing investments which carried far more risk than was believed.109 
Incredibly, not only did the investment banks purchase and sell 
these risky investments, but they also lent money to other investors to 
purchase the securities.  Citigroup lent much of the purchase price to 
some hedge funds investing in MBS.110  Anxious to sell their MBS 
offerings to investors, banks were all too happy to finance the purchase 
price.  This combination of involvement almost caused some of our 
biggest investment banks (e.g., Citigroup, Merrill Lynch) to fail.  
Unfortunately, some of our best-known investment banks, Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers, did fail because of the subprime crisis. 
 108. See Bertschi, supra note 8; RESERVE PROSPECTUS, supra note 104, at 3.  The 
Reserve Fund was restricted to investments of only the highest credit quality, bonds 
qualifying for the two highest short-term credit ratings, yet was still able to maintain to 
$785 million in exposure to now-bankrupt investment bank Lehman Brothers when the 
firm defaulted on its loans.  Peter Rizzo & Francoise Nichols, Credit FAQ:  How Are 
Events In The Financial Markets Affecting Money-Market Funds?, RatingsDirect 
(Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 30, 2008, at 2, available at http://www2. 
standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,6,5,1204839960577.html.  In 
the ensuing two days, investors to withdraw 60% of The Reserve’s $40 billion asset 
base.  Id.  The Reserve became the first money fund open to the general public to 
“break the buck”, even though the fund successfully held a share price of $1 since its 
inception and managers intended to keep it that way as of March 2008.  See John 
Waggoner, Reserve Primary Money Market Fund Breaks a Buck, USA Today, Sept. 17, 2008; Reserve 
Prospectus, supra note 104.  S&P defended its performance: 
[W]e first discuss actions that the management team is considering given the current 
circumstances to understand how the action may affect our view of the fund’s NAV 
and our assessment of the rating level. We generally will not take an immediate rating 
action if management intends to take supportive actions to preserve the fund’s NAV 
in a timely manner, and presents us with a credible plan to do so. 
Rizzo & Nichols, supra note 108, at 5. 
 109. See Lucchetti, supra note 9. 
 110. See generally Bradley Keoun, Citigroup’s $1.1 Trillion of Mysterious Assets 
Shadows Earnings, BLOOMBERG, July 13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news 
?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=a1liVM3tG3aI.  Citi set up off balance sheet struc-
tured investment vehicles and used leverage to buy up $100 billion worth of subprime 
collateralized debt obligations.  Andy Kessler, What’s Next for the Banks?, WALL ST. J., 
Jan 24, 2008, at A17. 
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G.  Global Investment 
Outside of the United States, the international community has been 
profitably selling the U.S. goods and looking for someplace to invest 
these profits.111  Since the U.S. markets have always been viewed as the 
most secure, much of the foreign investment money has been reinvested 
in the American securities markets.112  The investment bankers took ad-
vantage of this inflow of capital to sell these foreign investors what they 
were seeking: high yielding, secure investments.  This has been de-
scribed as a “global savings glut.”113  This inflow of foreign investment 
created a greater demand for investment vehicles, including MBS.  
Everyone wanted to profit from the flourishing U.S. housing market and 
its rapidly expanding lenders. 
Foreign investors, foreign pension funds, foreign municipal funds, 
and other types of foreign investors were lured into relatively high yield-
ing MBSs which were highly rated by respected CRAs.  In normal 
times, these investment decisions would be quite rational.  These, 
however, were not normal times. 
H.  Appraisers 
The appraisers who inspect the property to be given a mortgage are 
another key ingredient in the origination process.114  Their job is to 
 
 111. See Stephen Roach, Imbalances Matter More than Ever, GLOBAL ECON. 
FORUM (Morgan Stanley, New York, N.Y.), May 5, 2006, http://www.morgan 
stanley.com/views/gef/archive/2006/20060505-Fri.html, accord Kenneth Rogoff, 
Betting With the House’s Money (Brookings, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 15, 2007, 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0215monetarypolicy_rogoff.aspx?p=1. 
 112. See Paul Blustein, Foreign Investment’s Flip Side; U.S. Trade Deficit Swells 
Along With Consumption, Debt, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2005, at A01. 
 113. See Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Sandridge 
Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond, Virginia (Mar. 10, 2005), 
available at http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/sep2006/pdf/bernanke_2005.pdf. 
 114. Historically, the appraisal was a six-step process that included:  (1) definition 
of the problem; (2) preliminary survey and appraisal plan; (3) data collection and 
analysis; (4) application of the three approaches to value, (5) reconciliation of value 
indications; and (6) final estimate of defined value.  In an effort to increase efficiency 
and reduce costs, the lending industry has significantly increased reliance on automated 
value models.  Mason & Rosner, supra note 2, at 9 (citing Debra Cope, ACB 13th 
Annual Real Estate Lending Report (2006)).  Appraisers with access to databases of 
recent sales sometimes employ OLS regression. If there is insufficient data, the grid 
adjustment method is used.  Michael Lacour-Little & Richard K. Green, Are Minorities 
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ensure the underlying property has sufficient value to support a 
mortgage.  In the event of a default, the lender will recover the principal 
amount of the mortgage.  The industry standard has been that the maxi-
mum amount of a mortgage given on a specific property should not 
exceed 80% of the appraised value.115  If a mortgage lender wishes to 
make a loan, he does not want to be told that the property does not have 
sufficient value.  If the appraiser asserts a lower value, the lender may 
simply find a more aggressive appraiser.  Since many lenders were 
getting significant fees simply for making the loan and were not exposed 
to default risk, it became more desirable to make the loan, earn the fee 
and move on to the next loan.  Appraisers were under significant pres-
sure to come up with inflated appraisals.116  In a recent survey of 
appraisers, 91% replied that they had been asked to inflate an appraisal 
value of a home.117  The end result was a decrease in the cushion when a 
mortgage began to fail.  Even in a foreclosure, the owner of the mort-
gage would lose money because a forced sale could not generate enough 
to pay the mortgage balance.  As the price of homes decreased, this 
problem was greatly exacerbated.  Millions of homes now have mort-
gages which far exceed their value.118  The result is that not only the 
or Minority Neighborhoods More Likely to Get Low Appraisals?, 16 J. OF REAL EST. 
FIN. & ECON., 301, 304 (1998). 
 115. The Subprime Crisis: An Overview, supra note 44, at 13.  Also, appraisers 
were traditionally chosen from organized blind pools and randomly assigned.  This 
practice has been largely abandoned.  Mason & Rosner, supra note 2, at 9. 
 116. A mortgage broker’s compensation increases with the value of the loan, giving 
these brokers a strong incentive to increase the appraised value of the home.  The 
appraisal industry has repeatedly and routinely complained of pressures to “hit the bid.”  
Those who are unwilling to succumb to these pressures face the risk of lost business.  
Mason & Rosner, supra note 2, at 9.  The New York Attorney General, Andrew 
Cuomo, filed a lawsuit against First American Corp., a real estate appraisal firm, on 
Nov. 1, 2008.  The suit alleges that Washington Mutual, a bank, had pressured First 
American to hire appraisers who would inflate property values. 
 117. Survey Shows Appraisers Experience Pressure from Requestors, REUTERS, 
May 14, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS141380+14-May-2008 
+BW20080514 (describing a survey of appraisers). 
 118. The balance on millions of home mortgages exceeds the current value of the 
collateral.  Estimates vary widely on the extent of the problem.  See Edmund L. 
Andrews & Louis Uchitelle, Rescues for Homeowners in Debt Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2008, at A1 (8.8 million homeowners or 10.3 % of the total); Karen 
Blumenthal, Family Money: ‘Underwater’ Need Not Mean Foreclosure, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 5, 2008, at D1 (between one in six and one in eight homeowners); Editorial, The 
Next $300 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at A16 (12 million mortgages); David 
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home owner, but also the lender, will suffer substantial loss in a fore-
closure.119 
I.  Credit Rating Agencies 
The CRAs were issuing ratings which were not supported by the 
underlying instruments.120  Mortgages were bundled into groups and 
given triple A ratings.121  CRAs were making outsized profits from 
rating MBS, which were paid by their clients – the issuers of the 
MBS.122  They behaved not as protectors of investors, but as enablers of 
the banks who were issuing the securities.123 
 
Streitfeld, Mortgage Plan May Aid Many And Irk Others, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at 
A1 (10 million homeowners); see also Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 37.  
Bankers would be hard pressed to argue this was an unexpected phenomenon.  A study, 
published in 1974, of delinquency rates for mortgages originated between 1961 and 
1972 on single-family homes located within the Pittsburgh area found a strong 
correlation between delinquencies and borrower equity.  When the LTV ratio increases 
from 80% to 90%, delinquency rates should increase by over two-thirds.  If the LTV 
ratio rises an additional 5%, from 90% to 95%, delinquency rates would jump by 
another 70%.  The study concluded “[a] rising equity-value ratio has the expected effect 
of lowering delinquency risk.”  George M. von Furstenberg & R. Jeffery Green, Home 
Mortgage Delinquencies: A Cohort Analysis, 29 J. OF FIN. 1545, 1547 (1974). 
 119. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) recognize the “near certainty of 
losses on most foreclosures,” and require buyers with a LTV ratio in excess 80 percent 
to purchase private mortgage insurance to mitigate the risk of loss to the GSE and MBS 
investors.  Lenders sustained enormous losses in real-estate-owned (REO) portfolios 
during the late 1980s, typically losing between 30 and 60 percent of the outstanding 
mortgage balance on a foreclosed home.  Mason & Rosner, supra note 2, at 7-8, 12. 
 120. STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATION, DIV. OF 
TRADING & MKTS., OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY 
REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (July 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
2008/craexamination070808.pdf [hereinafter SEC SUMMARY REPORT]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Frank L. Raiter, Managing Director and 
Head of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings Group, Standard and Poor’s, 
Mar. 1995-Apr. 2005), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200810221 
02804.pdf. 
 123. Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 47 B.C. L. REV. 169, 
190 (2007); see Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Frank L. Raiter, Managing 
Director and Head of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings Group, Standard 
and Poor’s, Mar. 1995-Apr. 2005), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/ 
20081022102804.pdf . 
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Ratings were issued without proper analysis of the bundled mort-
gages.124  In many cases, the CRAs did not even have access to the in-
dividual mortgages, yet they continued to issue prime ratings for the 
MBSs. 
The credit rating issued by a CRA is an overall assessment of a debt 
obligor’s creditworthiness and is meant to reflect only credit risk or de-
fault risk.125  The instrument issued by an obligor, the MBS, is the item 
being analyzed and rated.  When issuing a rating, the CRAs take into 
account the following loan underwriting characteristics126: 
(1) Cumulative loan to value ratio: 
The higher loan to value ratio, the less likely the loan will per-
form.  Since the borrower has less equity invested in the home 
there is less incentive to attempt to save a loan when the 
borrower has little equity to save.  The standard for a conform-
ing loan is that the amount of the loan be no more than 80% of 
the value of the property.  When a package of loans has a high 
loan to value ratio, the risk is increased. 
(2) Consumer credit score: 
The higher the credit score, the more likely the loan will be paid.  
If the average credit score on a package of loans is low, then the 
risk of default is increased.  Average credit scores below 720 in-
dicate higher risk of default. 
(3) Loan maturity: 
Shorter term loans realize fewer defaults.  Longer terms, espe-
cially ones exceeding 30 years, indicate a greater risk of default.  
The term of years is one of the least useful indicators of default. 
(4) Interest rate: 
If the interest rate charged on the mortgages exceeds the average 
for all loans, the risk of default is greater.  A higher interest rate 
 124. Id. 
 125. ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 103. 
 126. See Hearing, supra note 31, at 2-3 (statement of Frank L. Raiter, Managing 
Director and Head of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings Group, Standard 
and Poor’s, Mar. 1995-Apr. 2005), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/ 
20081022102804.pdf; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 110th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2007) (testimony of Michael Kanef, Group Managing 
Dir., Moody’s Investors Serv.), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ 
kanef.pdf. 
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indicates a lender’s assessment of the loan’s greater risk.  Many 
subprime loans carried excessive interest rates, reflecting both 
the lack of sophistication of the borrowers and the higher risk 
assessed by the lender.  High average interest rates in a package 
of loans indicate a higher risk of default. 
(5) Fixed rate versus adjustable rate: 
The default rate on ARMs is higher than on fixed rate mort-
gages.  This is a result of the teaser rates offered to ARMs bor-
rowers, which reset to much higher rates after the initial term. 
(6) Property Type: 
The type of property (single family, condo, multi family) has an 
impact on the default rate.  More condos and multi family prop-
erties tend to be investment properties, reducing the incentive to 
try to save a distressed mortgage. 
(7) Home Value: 
Properties having a lower value have a greater risk of default.  
Many entry level purchasers buy lower value homes, and many 
speculators concentrate on lower value homes. 
Credit rating agencies are hired by and paid by issuers of securities.  
If the issuer does not get the result from the CRA that it wants, it can 
simply take the lucrative business of rating securities elsewhere.  The 
rating agency relies entirely upon the fees paid by the issuer of a 
security.  There is tremendous pressure to bring forth the expected 
rating.  Thus, both the information given and the complexity of the secu-
rities are controlled by the issuers.  A serious conflict of interest between 
the agencies and their employers exists.  The CRAs find it in their own 
self-interest to issue as favorable a rating as possible.  At the same time, 
investors who rely on the credit rating agencies are unable to analyze the 
accuracy of a credit rating.  The investor is exposed to errors in the 
rating process, but has no input into the process. 
Conversely, in a corporate bond, the issuer, not the instrument, is 
rated.127  When rating a corporate bond, the CRAs are able to analyze 
the issuer’s financial strength and capability to react to adverse 
occurrences.  When rating an Asset Backed Security (“ABS”), however, 
the security’s terms are fixed and cannot react to adverse occurrences.  
Despite this important difference, Standard and Poor’s claims its 
 127. See Lucchetti & Ng, supra note 105. 
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0% 
and 
higher than an investor should expect for 
highly rated investments.132 
“ratings represent a uniform measure of credit quality globally and 
across all types of debt instruments.  In other words, an ‘AAA’ rated 
corporate bond should exhibit the same degree of credit quality as an 
‘AAA’ rated securitized issue.”128  An investor who relies on these 
ratings, and believes that the rating for an ABS is equivalent to the rating 
for a corporate bond, is being misled.  Defaults by investment grade 
rated corporate bonds are very rare.  Default rates for investment grade 
bonds (Aaa-Baa), for a long period (from 1983-2000), were calculated at 
.073%.129  The default rate for risky “junk bonds” rose to 2.0% in April, 
2008.130  The default rate for subprime mortgages is in excess of 1
is still rising.131 
Many of these subprime mortgages were packaged and sold as 
ABSs.  Clearly, these should not have been rated Aaa.  The default rate 
on these mortgages is far 
 
 128. Calvin R. Wong & Thomas G. Gillis, Principles-Based Rating 
Methodology for Global Structured Finance Securities, RATINGSDIRECT (Standard & 
Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), May 29, 2007, at 4, available at http://www2.standardand 
 
20Pages/Regulatory%20Affairs/Documents/default_and_recovery_rates
Win Praise; 
, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103& 
Q
poors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/PrinciplesBasedRatingMethodology.pdf. 
 129. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., INC., GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH, SPECIAL 
COMMENT:  CORPORATE DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES: 1920-2006 23-24 (Feb. 
2007), available at http://www.moodys.com/cust/content/Content.ashx?source=Static
Content/Free%
_02_07.pdf. 
 130. Default rate for issuers of U.S. corporate junk bonds rated BB+ and below by 
Standard & Poor’s are expected to “catapult” to an all-time high of 13.9% by December 
2009, according to a January 22 Standard & Poor’s report.  David Hoffman, Managers 
Tread Carefully In Making Picks; High-Grade Corporates, Munis 
Treasuries, Junk Offerings Get Thumbs-Down, INV. NEWS, Feb. 1, 2009. 
 131. See Jody Shenn, Moody’s May Lower $402 Billion of Subprime-Loan Debt, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 26
sid=ag pgFBepZFw. 
 132. In a July 2007 letter informing investors in Bear Stearns’ High Grade Fund 
there was “very little value left” of net investor contributions totaling $1.08 billion since 
the fund’s inception in 2003, the firm said “[t]he Funds’ reported performance, in part, 
reflects the unprecedented declines in the valuations of a number of highly-rated (AA 
and AAA) securities.”  The SEC alleges, in a June 2008 complaint against the fund’s 
managers, “the undisclosed characteristics of many of the AAA/AA securities that the 
funds invested in rendered them fundamentally more likely to default than typical 
AAA/AA securities.”  The SEC also cites “a private e-mail” in which the fund manager 
allegedly “acknowledged that certain types of AAA CDOs held by the funds were ‘not 
really AAA’” because the subordination structure of the underlying loans subjected the 
CDOs to a heightened risk of defaults.  Letter from Bear, Stearns & Co., to Clients (July 
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The CRAs took the position that the bundled MBS were a statistical 
problem, not requiring analysis of the underlying instruments.133  The 
bundled mortgages were rated based upon historical default perfor-
mance.  Even if the bundle included only subprime mortgages, or liar’s 
loans, the individual mortgages were not evaluated.  In what became a 
massive rating of bundled mortgages – generating huge profits and 
keeping voracious issuers happy – investors were misled to a degree not 
previously seen.134 
Similarly, the CRAs were evaluating the ABS, not the mortgages in 
the bundle of securities.  These ABS were comprised of the mortgages 
owned by a SPE.  The SPE would create financing by issuing bonds.  
The CRA would evaluate whether the mortgage payments from the 
mortgagors coming into the SPE were sufficient to allow the payments 
required to the bondholders.  The SPE would issue 12 classes of bonds, 
rated from AAA to Ba1.  These classes were called tranches.  Highest 
rated bonds had first priority on mortgage payments, and priorities 
would follow down the lowest rated bonds. Because of these bond tiers, 
CRAs felt comfortable rating the top tier bonds as AAA.135 
Using mathematical models, investment banks were careful to issue 
bonds which met the required standards for AAA ratings.136  CRAs, 
which rate investment grade securities, cut corners and provided an easy 
mechanism for selling the packaged securities.137  They ignored the fact 
that subprime mortgages default at a much higher rate than corporate 
investment grade securities138 and rated these two investments as equals.  
This was very misleading to investors.  There was a disconnect between 
the true risk involved with these mortgages and the risks adequately dis-
closed to investors.139  As long as the home values increased and 
19, 2007) (on file with author), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ 
2812345/Bear-Stearns-letter-sent-to-investors-last-night.html (outlining fund’s history 
and alleging fraud); Complaint at 8-12, SEC v. Cioffi, No. 08 CV 2457 (E.D.N.Y. June 
pra note 120. 
://www.robertstoweengland.com/docu 
ading Places?, 
-16, SEC v. Cioffi, No. 08 CV 2457 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 
19, 2008) (on file with author). 
 133. See Lowenstein, supra note 9. 
 134. See SEC SUMMARY REPORT, su
 135. See Lowenstein, supra note 9. 
 136. See Lucchetti & Ng, supra  note 105. 
 137. Robert S. England, Industry Trends: Building a Bubble, 69 MORTGAGE 
BANKING 48 (Nov. 1, 2008), available at http
ments/MBM.England.Bubble.11-08Factiva.pdf. 
 138. See, e.g., Cynthia Koons & Marine Cole, Is Investment Grade Tr
WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at C5; see Lucchetti & Ng, supra note 105. 
 139. See Complaint at 15
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 rating of a security.141 
As: 
 
defaults were minimal, no one was suffering.  The CRAs have now 
admitted that their method of rating MBS, based upon incorrect 
assumptions, “did not work.”140  CRAs, however, are exempt from 
liability for any inappropriate
The CRAs are dominated by three agencies: Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch.142  During the subprime mortgage boom, Moody’s 
earnings grew by 900% and its stock price soared by 600%.143  Struc-
tured finance accounted for nearly 47 percent of Moody’s 2006 reve-
nues.144  These CRAs were being paid by the investment bankers they 
were supposed to watching.  This created a direct conflict of interest.145 
On September 29, 2006, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was 
enacted,146 amending the registration requirements for CRAs and pro-
viding for new reporting and record keeping requirements.  On June 16, 
2008, the SEC issued proposed regulations,147 which include several 
new requirements for the CR
2008) (on file with author). 
 140. Hearing, supra note 31, at 3 (statement of Deven Sharma, President, Standard 
ril 2009), 
sinessNews/id 
S&feedName=businessNews. 
ment banks for their ratings – a category of business known as 
ies of Credit Rating Agencies 
, Pub. L. No. 291, 120 Stat. 1327 
and Poor’s). 
 141. 17 C.F.R. §  230.436(g)(1) (exempting “the security rating assigned . . . by a 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization”from the provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933); Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers 30-32, available at http://www.tcf.or.jp/data/20050928_Frank_Partnoy. 
pdf; Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional 
Investor Perspective 5-6 (Council of Institutional Investors white paper, Ap
available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CRAWhitePaper04-14-09.pdf. 
 142. See, e.g., Sudip Kar-Gupta, SEC Probing Main Credit Rating Agencies, 
REUTERS, May 26, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/bu
USL2619694120080526?feedType=RS
 143. See Lowenstein, supra note 9. 
 144. Greg Farrell, Credit-Rating Agencies Feel Heat, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 2007, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-08-12-crunch-rating_n. 
htm (“Moody’s and S&P generate almost 50% of their revenue from deals where 
they’re paid by the invest
‘structured finance.’”). 
 145. See Hearing,  supra note 31, at 4 (testimony of Jerome Fons, Economist and 
Managing Director, Moody’s); Partnoy, supra note 123 (adding criticism of the CRAs 
practice of issuing unsolicited ratings and marketing of ancillary consulting services 
related to ratings); Arthur Pinto, Control and Responsibilit
in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 345 (2006). 
 146. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act Of 2006
(2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7). 
 147. Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 
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(1) A CRA can only issue a rating on a structured product if the 
information on the underlying product is available; 
(2) A CRA must make all of its ratings and subsequent ratings 
actions publicly available; 
(3) Any person participating in a credit rating decision is 
prohibited from negotiating the fee that the issuer pays; and 
(4) Gifts in excess of $25 from any issuer are prohibited. 
J.  Bank Regulators 
Banks and mortgage companies are expected to be held to some 
minimum standard of conduct by either the state or the federal gov-
ernment.  This part of the equation fell apart during the last few years.  
No one stepped in to restrict the risky loans being made to borrowers.  
Although the Federal Reserve Board claimed it did not have authority to 
regulate these loans, it finally proposed regulations to set lending guide-
lines in December 2007.148  For a number of years, despite growing 
criticism, the Federal Reserve chose a hands-off policy when it came to 
regulating the new breed of mortgage lender.149  Of 2002 subprime 
loans, only 45 percent originated at banks subject to compliance exams 
every three years; an additional 43 percent were originated at affiliates 
of financial holding companies, loans which the Fed had the authority to 
review “for compliance with lending laws, though on a less thorough 
and less timely basis.”150  In addition, the federal government took steps 
to invoke federal authority to invalidate attempts by some states to regu-
 
36,212, 36,227-78, 36,233-34 (proposed June 16, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240 & 249b). 
 148. See Truth in Lending Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522-01, 44,528-31 (July 30, 2008). 
 149. On December 29, 2005, a proposed Interagency guidance was published by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, The Office of the Comptroller of 
Currency, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
and the National Credit Union Administration.  The Proposed Regulations outlined 
guidance for nontraditional lending.  Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage 
Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,249 (proposed Dec. 29, 2005). 
 150. The independent mortgage companies, which issued the remaining 12 percent 
of 2002 subprime mortgage loans, were not systematically examined at all, though they 
were subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission.  Edward M. 
Gramlich, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, 
and Challenges, Remarks at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy 
Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (May 21, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040521/default.htm. 
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late these mortgages.151  Only when the default rates soared did the 
Federal Reserve issue regulations to rein in some of the more egregious 
borrowing practices.152  The Federal Reserve has always taken the posi-
tion that asset bubbles are outside their domain.153 
The government received extensive warnings concerning the sub-
prime mortgage market.  It chose largely to ignore them.  The banks 
which were profiting from the issuance of the poor mortgages were 
employing significant lobbying efforts to keep regulators away from 
their pot of gold.154 
As mortgages began to default, investors who had bought MBSs 
quickly began to sell them.  When the MBS market eventually col-
lapsed, some MBSs had no worth whatsoever.  Investment banks, hedge 
funds, pension funds and even municipal governments were left with 
securities that could not be sold.  This led to the collapse or near col-
lapse of a number of banks.  As the next Part will explore, the govern-
ment, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve acted 
 151. See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism And Predatory Lending: Unmasking 
The Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 86-87 (Spring 2005) (characterizing 
preemption language used to by Rep. Bob Ney, sponsor of the failed “Responsible 
Lending Act”, as the unequivocal elimination of state mortgage lending law).  2001 
reforms that barred banks from lending “to borrowers who do not demonstrate the 
capacity to repay the loan” explicitly excluded the state-regulated finance companies 
and mortgage brokers that originated the majority of subprime loans.  In 2000, Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan rejected then-Fed governor Edward 
Gramlich’s informal proposal to examine the lending practices of bank mortgage 
affiliates.  In 2002, Greenspan rejected calls from Democrats to use the Fed’s power 
under the Federal Trade Act to write rules on unfair and deceptive practices.  Greg Ip et 
al., Housing Bust Fuels Blame Game, WALL ST. J.., Mar. 19, 2008, at A1. 
 152. See infra Part V.B.3. 
 153. See A Short History of Modern Finance: Link by Link, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 
18, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1241 
5730.  See generally Adam S. Posen, Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles, 9 
INT’L FIN. 1, pp. 109-24 (Spring 2006).  Contra, Nouriel Roubini, Why Central Banks 
Should Burst Bubbles, 9 INT’L FIN. 1, pp. 87–107 (Spring 2006). 
 154. Matt Appuzzo, They Warned Us, But U.S. Eased Loan Rules, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Dec. 1, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id= 
6364464.  The home loan president of Washington Mutual, one of the biggest issuers of 
subprime mortgages told federal regulators in early 2006 “these mortgages have been 
considered more safe and sound for portfolio lenders than many fixed rate mortgages.”  
Id.  Within two years, Washington Mutual became the largest bank failure in U.S. 
history. 
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quickly to try to stem the damage to the nation’s confidence and to its 
banking system. 
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Many people have argued that the Federal Reserve should have 
acted to deflate the housing bubble.  While Chairman Ben Bernanke has 
stated that the Federal Reserve should stay away from asset bubbles – a 
course they have followed throughout their history155 – some argue that 
the Federal Reserve should at least identify asset bubbles and possibly 
address them during formation to limit the ultimate damage to the 
economy when the resulting bubble collapses.156  Some elected officials 
believe that the Federal Reserve should have tightened lending 
restrictions and imposed some regulation on the new breed of lenders.157  
This could have at least softened the damage from the subprime debacle. 
A.  Existing Regulatory Schemes 
1.  Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)158 
TILA is a consumer credit law that was designed to protect 
consumers by requiring disclosures in credit transactions.  It imposes 
limits on mortgage interest rates, but at a level which did not deter high 
rates on subprime mortgages.  TILA requires that a lender give the 
borrower full disclosure of all fees.  It allows for damages, but does not 
 
 155. Benjamin  S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Asset-Price “Bubbles” 
and Monetary Policy, Remarks Before the New York Chapter of the National 
Association for Business Economics, New York, New York (Oct. 15, 2002), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2002/20021015/default.htm. 
 156. See id.; see also Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do 
About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741, 802-03 (2000). 
 157. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) introduced legislation on March 28, 2007 to 
create an agency to oversee mortgage brokers.  Some states are also planning legis-
lation.  Under the proposal, a federal regulator would regulate mortgage brokers and all 
other non-bank lenders who currently fall outside federal oversight.  The bill would also 
get rid of what are called “liar loans”, in which income and values are doctored to allow 
a consumer to buy a home they cannot afford.  Borrower’s Protection Act of 2007, S. 
1299, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968).  The interest ceiling on mortgages is set at 8% over 
the current comparable U.S. Treasury Note rate.  12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2008). 
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allow a borrower to rescind the mortgage if the disclosure was inade-
quate. 
However, this law had little effect on borrowers decision-making: 
the documents provided to the borrowers were simply too complex.  
Many mortgages – especially ARMs and balloon payment mortgages – 
are difficult for a lay person to understand without additional explana-
tion. 
2.  Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”)159 
HOEPA was passed in 1994 and gave the Federal Reserve the 
authority to regulate home mortgages, specifically high rate, high fee 
mortgages.  It amended the TILA to cover first lien loans and certain 
high rate second lien loans.  The HOEPA limited closing fees and 
points, required full disclosure of the loan’s interest rate, and required 
written notice of all fees and costs by three days before the closing date.  
It also banned prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and due on 
demand loans.160  However, the Federal Reserve did not implement 
these tools and did not issue regulations to enforce this Act until 200
3.  Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (“RESPA”)162 
RESPA, enacted in 1974, requires certain disclosure requirements 
for lenders in a residential transaction.  These disclosures include:  (1) a 
special information booklet; a good faith estimate of charges; (2) the 
actual settlement costs known on the day before the transaction is com-
pleted; (3) actual settlement costs; and (5) escrow payments scheduled 
for the first year of the mortgage. 
These estimates are usually inaccurate and can confuse even an 
experienced buyer.  The need for better disclosure requirements to 
borrowers remains. 
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. 
 160. See infra V.B.3. 
 161. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 162. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (1974). 
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4.  Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”)163 
ECOA prohibits a creditor from discriminating against credit appli-
cants on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital 
status, age, or because an applicant receives income from a public assis-
tance program. 
5.  Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)164 
FCRA protects consumers from incorrect information in their credit 
files held by CRAs.  FCRA allows individuals to challenge the infor-
mation in their credit history and to access their file once a year at no 
cost. 
6. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (“CRARA”)165 
CRARA requires the registration of CRAs with the SEC.166  It also 
requires regulation of the CRAs by the SEC and mandates that CRAs 
must develop rules to avoid conflicts of interest.167  CRARA prohibits 
certain practices by the CRAs, including: 
(a) “[C]onditioning or threatening to condition the issuance of 
a credit rating on the purchase by the obligor or an affiliate 
thereof of other services or products, including pre-credit 
rating assessment products”;168 
(b) “[L]owering or threatening to lower a credit rating on, or 
refusing to rate, securities or money market instruments 
issued by an asset pool or as any part of any asset-backed 
or mortgage backed securities transaction, unless a portion 
of the assets within such pool or part of such transaction 
also is rated” by the CRA;169 
(c) “[M]odifying or threatening to modify a credit rating or 
otherwise departing from its adopted systematic proce-
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1991). 
 164. Id. § 1681 (2003). 
 165. Id. § 78o-7 (2009). 
 166. Id. § 78o-7(a). 
 167. Id.  The SEC is given the authority to issue final rules concerning disclosure 
and conflicts of interest.  Id. § 78o-7(c)(1)(h). 
 168. Id. § 78o-7(i)(1)(A). 
 169. Id. § 78o-7(i)(1)(B). 
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dures and methodologies in determining credit ratings, 
based on whether the obligor . . . will purchase the credit 
rating or any other service or product” of the CRA.170 
Each CRA is directed to appoint a compliance officer to administer 
policies and procedures to ensure compliance with securities laws.171 
The unthinkable calamities resulting from faulty ratings of MBSs 
and Collateral Debt Obligations (“CDOs”) issued after 2006 have prov-
en beyond any rational doubt that CRARA is insufficient to properly 
control the actions of the CRAs.  The CRAs must be held responsible 
for their ratings and must be held liable for ratings that mislead invest-
ors.  The CRAs’ practice of not reviewing the underlying securities in 
packages of MBSs and of relying upon statistical analysis misled 
thousands of investors into investments that did not undergo the proper 
risk analysis.  The exemption of these CRAs from investor liability must 
be carefully reviewed and amended to better allocate responsibility and 
to require that CRAs complete proper due diligence before issuing a 
rating.  As the next Part illustrates, the federal government’s legislative 
and regulatory responses to date have completely failed to take any steps 
in aligning CRAs’ interests with those investors who rely on the CRAs’ 
ratings.  The CRAs continue to make the decisions with impunity.172 
B.  Legislative and Regulatory Responses 
1.  Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act 
In December 2007, President Bush signed into law the Mortgage 
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007.173  This Act provides some relief 
for people who took out adjustable rate mortgages and other mortgages 
they couldn’t afford.174  The ultimate effect is expected to be very limi-
ted.  Prior to this Act, if a lender forgave debt of a mortgagor, the 
amount of forgiven debt was treated as gross income by the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) and was subject to taxation.175  In an attempt 
to encourage workouts between mortgagees and mortgagors, the Act 
specifies that forgiven indebtedness from a mortgage on a personal resi-
dence is no longer taxable income.176  When a property is in foreclosure, 
or is about to go into foreclosure, it is better for both the borrower and 
 
 170. Id. § 78o-7(i)(1)(C). 
 171. Id. § 78o-7(j). 
 172. See Partnoy, supra note 141. 
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lender to try to sell that property to a third party.  If the sale price is less 
than the mortgage, the lender must “forgive” the balance of the mort-
gage in order to complete the sale.177 
2.  Freeze in “Teaser Rates” 
Beginning in late 2007, the Bush administration announced that 
lenders would freeze low “teaser rates” on adjustable rate mortgages.178  
Under this freeze, the initial low interest rate must remain in effect for a 
period longer than the contracted period.  However, this would only 
apply to borrowers who are current on their payments and cannot afford 
payment increases.  The then-Secretary of Treasury, Henry Paulson, has 
urged both lenders and borrowers of subprime mortgages to aggressively 
pursue the modification of loans.179  Although this is a strong 
suggestion, it has no import of law.180  Mortgage holders are separated 
into the following g
(a) Borrowers who can afford to pay the higher rates on their 
adjusting mortgage; 
 173. Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 
1803 (2007). 
 174. Id. 
 175. This income is income from forgiveness of indebtedness, measured by the 
difference between the home’s value and the mortgage balance. 
 176. I.R.C. § 108 (h) (added by the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, 121 Stat. 
1803). 
 177. This transaction is called a “short sale”. 
A ‘short sale’ occurs when a property is sold for less than the amount owed by the 
borrower. A short sale can only occur with the lender’s approval.  A short sale 
typically gets approval before a foreclosure if the lender thinks it will save money by 
agreeing to the short sale rather than having to go through the foreclosure process. 
Karen Oakes, What Is a “Short Sale”?, MORTGAGE L. NETWORK, Jan. 5, 2008, 
http://www.mortgagelawnetwork.com/what-is-a-short-sale/. 
 178. Edmund Andrews, Rate Freeze Said to Offer Limited Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2007, at C1. 
 179. Sheila Bair, the Head of the FDIC has urged a plan which would allow modi-
fication of loans, with the borrower being limited in monthly payments to 31% of their 
gross monthly income and providing that the government would share in the losses of 
the borrower who had modified defaults anyway.  See Tami Luhby, Bill Embraces 
FDIC Loan Modification Plan, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 10, 2008, http://money.cnn. 
com/2008/12/10/news/economy/waters_loan_mods/?postversion=2008121013. 
 180. Legislation was introduced into the House of Representatives on December 10, 
2008, to allow for the modification program.  Id. 
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(b) Borrowers who are in homes they cannot afford; and 
(c) Borrowers who could afford their homes, but not at the 
adjusted rates.181 
This Treasury suggestion has no benefit for those who can afford 
their mortgage payments or who clearly cannot afford the home – 
groups (a) and (b).182  It only impacts those borrowers who have the fi-
nancial means, but are struggling to pay higher adjusted rates.  This 
group can have their mortgage rate frozen at the lower “teaser rate” for 
up to five years.183  Lenders have objected to this plan, claiming that it 
unfairly relieves people of their contractual duties.184  The Treasury 
Department, however, believes that by saving the high cost of a fore-
closure action, both parties to the mortgage will ultimately benefit from 
the program, since increased foreclosures further depress the value of 
housing and lenders the receive lower prices for the foreclosed prop-
erties. 
3.  Federal Reserve Regulations 
By July 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve finally acted by announcing 
its issuance of Final Regulations, Regulation Z, pursuant to the authority 
given by HOEPA.185  The regulations offer protection for what is termed 
“higher priced mortgage loans”.186  These protections include: 
(1) The lender must consider the borrower’s ability to repay 
the loan from income and assets other than the home’s 
 181. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y of the U. S. Treasury, Actions Taken and Actions 
Needed in U.S. Mortgage Markets, Remarks at the Office of Thrift Supervision 
National Housing Forum (Dec. 3, 2008). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See James R. Hagerty & Lingling Wei, The Housing Plan: Pressure to Rework 
Mortgages Will Ripple Through Industry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A4; Renae 
Merle, New Model Is Forged In Bank’s Wreckage; U.S. Reworking IndyMac Mortgages 
By the Thousands, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2008, at A1. 
 185. Truth in Lending Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522-01, 44,529-31 (July 30, 2008).  The 
final rule is effective on October 1, 2009, except for 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(3), which is 
effective on April 1, 2010.  Id. at 44,598.  The following references cite to this final 
rule. 
 186. 12 C.F.R. § 226.35 (2008) (defining a “higher-priced mortgage loan” as a loan 
secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling with an APR in excess of the average 
prime offer rate for a comparable transaction by over 1.5, in the case of a first mortgage, 
and 3.5, in the case of a subordinate lien on the property, percentage points). 
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value.187  In computing the ability to pay, the lender must 
use the highest scheduled payment in the first seven years 
of the loan;188 
(2) A creditor must verify the income and assets which are 
relied upon to determine repayment ability;189 and 
(3) Prepayment penalties are prohibited if the payment can 
change any time during the first four years of the loan.  For 
other higher priced loans, the prepayment penalty must 
expire after two years.190 
Lenders must also establish escrow accounts for property taxes and 
homeowner’s insurance for all first lien mortgages.191 
The regulations target “high priced” mortgage loans secured by a 
person’s principal residence.  They provide four specific protections for 
borrowers: 
(1) Creditors are prohibited from engaging in a pattern or 
practice of extending credit without considering borrow-
ers’ ability to repay the loan;192 
 187. Id. § 226.34(a)(4).  The Fed reasoned “borrowers cannot reasonably avoid 
injuries from lenders’ disregard of repayment ability” because borrowers’ own assess-
ment of their repayment ability may be influenced by their belief that a lender would 
not provide credit to a consumer who did not have the capacity to repay, subprime 
customers will accept loans knowing they may have difficulty affording the payments 
because they reasonably believe a more affordable loan will not be available to them 
and consumers are often urged to overstate their income or assets with the encourage-
ment of a loan originator who makes it clear that the consumer’s actual income or assets 
are not high enough to qualify them for the loans they seek.  Truth in Lending Act, 73 
Fed. Reg. at 44,542. 
 188. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34 (a)(4)(iii)(B). 
 189. Id. § 226.34 (a)(4)(ii)(A) (requiring verification of expected income or assets, 
by the consumer’s Internal Revenue Service Form W-2, tax returns, payroll receipts, 
financial institution records, or other third-party documents that provide reasonably 
reliable evidence of the consumer’s income or assets). 
 190. Id. § 226.35(b)(2). 
 191. Id. § 226.35(b)(3)(i).  Escrow is not required if the collateral on the loan 
secured by the principal residence is a co-op.  Id. § 226.35(b)(3)(ii)(A).  Where a 
condominium association has an obligation to the condominium unit owners to maintain 
a master policy insuring condominium units, the escrow requirements do not apply.  Id. 
§ 226.35(b)(3)(ii)(B). 
 192. Id. § 226.34(a)(4). 
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(2) Creditors would be required to verify the income and 
assets they rely upon in making the loan;193 
(3) If a consumer’s payment can change during the first four 
years following consummation of the mortgage, prepay-
ment penalties are prohibited outright. If the payment is 
fixed for four years, any prepayment penalty period is 
limited to two years;194 and 
(4) Creditors must establish escrow accounts for taxes and 
insurance.195 
These “high priced” loans apply to subprime mortgages, but do not 
affect conforming mortgages.196 
The Federal Reserve Board has also proposed additional restric-
tions, which would apply the following rules: 
• Lenders could not compensate mortgage brokers for selling 
“yield spread” mortgages to the borrower, unless the borrow-
er has previously agreed to such compensation.197  These 
“yield spread” payments are fees generated by higher priced 
mortgages; 
• Creditors and mortgages brokers would be prohibited from 
coercing an appraiser while the appraiser performs the ap-
praisal;198 
• Mortgage servicing companies would be subject to a number 
of restrictions.199  For example, the servicer must credit any 
payment on the day it is received, and must provide the 
borrower with a schedule of fees; and 
 193. Id. §  226.34(a)(4)(ii)(A). 
 194. Truth in Lending Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522-01, 44,551 (July 30, 2008) 
(rejecting a proposed rule requiring a prepayment penalty provision to expire at least 
sixty days before the first date on which a periodic payment amount may increase under 
the loan’s terms as moot under the more restrictive 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(2)). 
 195. 12 C.F.R § 226.35. 
 196. By its terms, 12 C.F.R. § 226.35 only applies to “higher-priced” mortgages as 
defined within 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a). 
 197. Truth in Lending Act, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,563 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 
226.36(a)). 
 198. 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(b). 
 199. Id. § 226.36(c). 
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• Creditors would be required to give the borrower a good 
faith estimate of closing costs within three days of the appli-
cation for the loan.200 
Nevertheless, while these regulatory changes are certainly welcome 
for future borrowers, questions remain as to why the Fed did not take 
these steps earlier. 
C. Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) 
In response to a meltdown of the international credit market, on 
October 3, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act (the “Stabilization Act”), giving the 
Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”), through a newly created 
office, “The Office of Financial Stability”, power to help restore value to 
troubled assets by either purchasing these assets or guaranteeing them.201  
Through TARP, which is included in the Stabilization Act, the Secretary 
may use up to $700 Billion to purchase distressed assets and to manage, 
workout, finance and repackage those distressed assets, mainly MBSs, 
which had severely diminished in value.202 
1.  Troubled Assets 
“Troubled Assets” are defined as “residential or commercial mort-
gages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based 
on or related to such mortgages.”203  The Stabilization Act only applies 
to Troubled Assets issued before March 14, 2008.204  However, the 
 
 200. Id. § 226.19. 
 201. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211, 5212. 
 202. 12 U.S.C. § 5211.  “The assets affected under the government plan are largely 
loans and securities backed by residential and commercial real estate.  Such assets have 
been devastated by the meltdown of the housing markets and have started coming under 
even greater strain in recent weeks as the U.S. economy slows.”  David Enrich et al., 
U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A1.  As 
originally conceived, mortgage assets were one of many troubled assets at the heart of a 
complex TARP program.  Andy Kessler, What Paulson Is Trying to Do, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 15, 2008, at A19.  Paulson soon broadened TARP’s scope and shifted its focus.  
Deborah Solomon, Bailout’s Next Phase:  Consumers – Paulson Quits Plan to Buy Bad 
Assets; Focus on Credit Cards, Car and Student Loans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at 
A1. 
 203. 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9)(A). 
 204. Id. 
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Secretary has authority to determine that other assets may be purchased 
if the purchase “is necessary to promote financial market stability.”205  
The instruments which may be purchased thus include: Alt-A mort-
gages, subprime mortgages, and prime residential mortgages; MBSs and 
CDOs; syndicated commercial mortgages; and other mortgage related 
derivatives.206 
2.  Eligible Financial Institutions 
The Secretary is allowed to purchase Troubled Assets from a 
financial institution “established and regulated under the laws of the 
United States or any State.”207  The financial institution must have 
“significant operations within the United States.”208  Excluded are “any 
central bank or institution owned by a foreign government,”209 as well as 
privately owned hedge funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts (“REITs”) 
and other conduit entities. 
3.  Limits on TARP 
The general limit on purchased troubled assets is $250 billion, and 
the program is set to end on December 31, 2009.210  However, the 
Secretary and Congress may expand the program to a maximum of $700 
billion, and extend it to October 3, 2010.211 
4. Pricing of Troubled Assets 
The Secretary is authorized to purchase Troubled Assets in a 
manner which will “minimize any potential long-term negative impact 
on the taxpayer.”212  This provision was intended to give the Secretary 
wide latitude in choosing how to price and purchase Troubled Assets.  
Issues to consider when pricing and purchasing Troubled Assets include 
the long-term return on the asset and the benefits to the overall econ-
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. § 5202(9)(B). 
 207. Id. § 5202(5). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. § 5225. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. § 5223(a)(1). 
2009 RESPONDING TO THE SUBPRIME MESS: 761 
 THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
 
omy.213  Direct purchases of assets from individual institutions are 
allowed, but prices paid must be “reasonable and reflect the underlying 
value of the asset.”214  The assets may also be purchased at auctions, 
which would better ensure a fair price is paid. 
The pricing of the troubled assets will be the main problem in 
implementing the program.  Although current market values are low and 
the purpose of the program is to quickly benefit institutions saddled with 
devalued assets, it is imperative that the price is set at a fair value.  
Otherwise, the Treasury Department will eventually face losses on the 
purchase of these assets.  If properly implemented, the program can help 
to provide funds for cash strapped institutions while allowing the 
government to buy assets at low prices, and either receive profits from 
the ultimate sale of the assets or from the collection of payments from 
the underlying mortgages.  The Stabilization Act specifically allows the 
institutions to realize a profit on the sale of assets to the Treasury.215 
5.  Executive Compensation 
One of the many controversial aspects of TARP is the possibility 
that executives of the financial institutions which are being aided with 
taxpayer funding may use some of the proceeds to pay themselves ex-
cessive compensation, rather than use the money to increase their lend-
ing.216  If the Fund purchases assets directly from a financial institution, 
the Stabilization Act provides that the Secretary has the authority to 
require the institution to meet “appropriate standards of executive 
compensation and corporate governance.”217 
6.  Management and Servicing 
As discussed above, the Secretary has broad authority to manage 
any assets purchased under TARP.218  This authority includes managing 
the assets, revenues, and portfolios acquired by the Fund.  The Secretary 
also has the power to create various vehicles if necessary to properly 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. § 5223(c). 
 215. Id. § 5223(a)(2), (b). 
 216. Steve Lohr, In Bailout Furor, Wall Street Pay Becomes Target for Congress, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at A1. 
 217. 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(1). 
 218. Id. § 5216(b). 
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manage the assets.  The Stabilization Act also encourages servicers of 
mortgages to use the HOPE NOW program for distressed residential 
mortgages.219 
At this point, however, it appears as though the government re-
sponse is insufficient to prevent future recurrences of the credit melt-
down.  Institutional memory is only a few years.  Eventually, absent 
effective oversight and proactive government regulation, greed and irre-
sponsibility will act to create a new bubble.  Part V of this Article will 
discuss the federal government’s takeovers of the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Part VI 
will then discuss the lawsuits emerging as the subprime fallout grows.  
Finally, Part VII will discuss the critical goals new regulations must 
achieve to prevent a second coming of the subprime leviathan and the 
devastating losses and demoralizing litigation inevitably left in its wake. 
V.  THE TAKEOVER OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 
The development of the secondary mortgage market in the United 
States was originally designed to provide additional mortgage funding 
for residential homeowners.220  Before the Great Depression, it was rare 
that an individual could purchase his own home.  During the depression 
many people had defaulted on their mortgages and lost their homes.  
There was a general lack of confidence in the mortgage system.  As a 
result of the depression, Congress took steps to encourage home owner-
ship and to help ensure adequate funding for prospective borrowers, 
thereby attempting to restore the shaken confidence in the market.  
Starting in 1934, mortgage insurance programs were developed in the 
Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”).221  The FHA provided loans 
which assured that the lender, in case of default, would be paid.  In 
addition, the Veteran’s Administration developed programs which guar-
anteed mortgage payments by veterans of the armed forces.222 
 219. Id. § 5219(a). 
 220. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2185, 2193 (2007). 
 221. National Homeownership Day, 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,957 (1995); HUD – The 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
 222. “In 1944, the GI Bill of Rights set up the Veterans Administration’s home loan 
guaranty program, enabling millions of veterans to start a new life for themselves and 
their families.”  60 Fed. Reg. 29,957. 
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In 1933, Congress created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(“RFC”).223  This agency engaged in many activities, but one of its most 
important functions was to buy FHA and Veterans Administration 
insured mortgages.  The increased liquidity of these loans made them 
more attractive as an investment for purchases of mortgages.  The RFC 
succeeded in adding money to the mortgage market by buying these 
loans from lenders, thereby freeing up more of the lender’s money to 
make new home loans.  The RFC began liquidating in 1953 and 
dissolved in 1957.224 
In 1938, Congress established the Fannie Mae as another boost to 
the secondary mortgage market.225  Fannie Mae’s intended purpose was 
to purchase new and existing mortgages from lenders.  In 1968, 
Congress divided Fannie Mae into two parts:  Fannie Mae and the 
Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”).226  In 
1970, Congress created yet another agency, the Freddie Mac.227 
For many years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were successful in 
promoting a stable, successful secondary mortgage market, where many 
other investors also bought mortgages.  Some REITs became mutual 
funds precisely to take advantage of the liquidity for mortgages in this 
secondary market.228  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds were long 
reputed to be excellent investments.229 
 223. Reconstruction Finance Corporation (Strategic Material Loan) Act, 72 Pub. L. 
No. 2, 47 Stat. 5 (1932) (repealed 1957). 
 224. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act, 83 Pub. L. No. 163, 67 
Stat. 230 (1953) (liquidating the RFC created under 15 U.S.C.S. prec § 601 by 
providing for RFC’s continuation through the summer of 1954 and terminating its 
lending powers in the fall of 1953); Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1957, 22 Fed. Reg. 
4633, 71 Stat. 647 (1957) (abolishing the RFC and transferring remaining functions to 
the Housing and Home Finance Agency, General Services Administration, Small 
Business Administration and Commerce Department). 
 225. Title III of the National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1992)). 
 226. Title VIII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 503 
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3931 (1968)). 
 227. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (1970). 
 228. See generally Sydney LeBlanc, Non-Traded REITs: Finally passing muster, 
5(13) Broker Dealer (2007), available at http://www.brokerdealermagazine.com/?p=95. 
 229. In 1999, when President Clinton predicted “the U.S. government will be debt-
free in 15 years,” the “[c]redit-market cognoscenti” speculated agency debt (Fannie, 
Freddie, etc.) was an “appropriate” replacement for the Treasury’s “long T-bond” as 
“the most representative gauge of long-term interest rates.” As Barron’s reported at the 
time: 
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At some point, the officers of these entities changed their method of 
operation to become more profit driven.  Instead of focusing on their 
stated purpose and exclusively buying conforming mortgages, the enti-
ties began to engage in riskier activities.  In 2003, Freddie Mac was sub-
ject to a significant accounting scandal.230  Although the Bush adminis-
tration attempted to create an agency for the oversight of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac,231 a bill sanctioning the creation of such an agency did 
not make it out of the Senate Banking Committee.232  The GSEs, taking 
on increasingly riskier investments, continued their descent into risky 
investment territory. 
In 2007, four executives paid fines and restitution for their activities 
relating to accounting fraud; Freddie Mac paid $50 Million in fines to 
settle claims made by the SEC.233  In the following year, the financial 
condition of both agencies deteriorated significantly as a result of invest-
ments in subprime mortgages.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had be-
come institutions with tremendous influence in Congress, earned by 
providing campaign funds and extensive lobbying efforts.  They had 
also become institutions which had made significant poor decisions in 
the pursuit of profits and increased personal compensation.234 
Aware that their securities are the most obvious replacement, given their implied 
government guarantee, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
are now offering regularly scheduled auctions of longer-dated benchmark securities. 
Already, notes William Lloyd of Barclays Capital, agencies are being used by Wall 
Street dealers to hedge interest rate risk in other securities, such as corporate bonds, 
one of the key functions performed by Treasuries. As liquidity in the agency market 
[increases], these issues should become a natural surrogate for T-bonds. 
William Pesek Jr., New Deficit? Budget surplus means shortfall of Treasury bonds, 
Barron’s, Dec. 27, 1999, at 21. 
 230. See Trouble at Home, THE ECONOMIST, June 14, 2003.  The top three 
executives at Freddie Mac departed abruptly after accounting irregularities were dis-
covered during an audit.  Allegations of missing documents, lavish pay and uncoopera-
tive directors surrounded the inquiry. 
 231. See Stephen Labaton, New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at C1. 
 232. S. 1656, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 233. David Hilzenrath, Raines, Federal Regulators Reach Settlement, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 20, 2008, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/washbizblog/2008/04/ 
regulator_to_dismiss_charges_a.html. 
 234. The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 12 (2008) 
(testimony of Edward Pinto, Former Chief Credit Officer of Fannie Mae), available at 
www.oversight.house.gov/documents/20081209145847.pdf. 
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On July 24, 2008, Congress passed the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), which established the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) and expanded federal regulatory 
authority over the GSEs.235  HERA provided for the dismissal of current 
CEOs and the takeover of management and the power of the board of 
directors.  All political activities and lobbying were terminated.  A direct 
relationship with the U.S. Treasury will provide new financing for the 
agencies.  The takeover of these two agencies provides an opportunity to 
expand their control and the regulation of the mortgage backed securities 
markets. 
VI.  LAWSUITS 
Whenever a disaster occurs, lawyers and lawsuits will follow.  The 
subprime mortgage debacle is spawning a massive wave of legal action.  
Class action suits are being brought against many of the players in the 
mortgage market.236  The securities firms that packaged and sold the 
mortgage backed securities are being sued.237  The banks and mortgage 
companies who created the mortgages are being sued.238  So are the in-
surers who insured the securities created with mortgages.239  Ratings 
agencies and homebuilders are likewise in the litigation frenzy.240  Pen-
sion funds that purchased the mortgage backed securities are being sued 
by their members.  In addition, some government agencies are going 
after the investment banks who sold these investments.241 
The most egregious players – the mortgage banks who made the 
bad loans – have been subject to the greatest number of legal actions, 
both by individual litigants and by government agencies.242  Bankruptcy 
 235. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 
2654 (2008).  President Bush signed HERA into law on July 30, 2008. 
 236. Martha Graybow, Class-Action Lawyers Pounce in Subprime Crisis, REUTERS, 
Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/bankingfinancial-SP-A/idUSN1426067 
420070314. 
 237. Brian E. Robison, Litigation in the Wake of the Subprime Lending Collapse:  
What Has Happened and Where We Are, in FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 59, 60-
61 (Skupien ed., Thomson West 2008). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 63. 
 240. Id. at 61-65. 
 241. Id. at 60-65. 
 242. In a report issued on February 14, 2008, Navigant Consulting said that 
subprime mortgage litigation in 2007 spawned 278 lawsuits, and the number was 
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courts have been flooded with cases that raise issues regarding mort-
gages. 
The Attorney General of New York has begun an investigation into 
the information provided by investment banks concerning the quality of 
the loans offered in securities packages.243  Millions of dollars of mort-
gages were bundled for sale to investors.  Many of the loans in the 
bundles did not meet minimum lending standards required within the 
pool of mortgages being purchased by investors.  This was a fact which 
should have been disclosed.  Estimates are that these poorer credit risk 
loans, sometimes called “exception loans,” made up as much as 80% of 
a bundle of securitized mortgages.244  These loans can be more likely to 
enter default than even subprime mortgages.245  The Attorney General 
has suggested that, in some cases, the investment banks did not fully dis-
close to investors the number of exception loans in a bundle.246  The 
specific issue is whether material information about the loans was fully 
disclosed to the investors and rating agencies.  The disclosures in many 
of the documents were simply generic discussions of investment risk. 
A number of cities are seeking redress from lenders for having 
flooded local housing markets with subprime mortgages which were 
unlikely to ever be repaid, thus putting entire neighborhoods at risk.  For 
example, the City of Cleveland has sued banks and financial institutions 
under the state public nuisance law.247  It asserts that the financial 
institutions created a public nuisance in areas of Cleveland because their 
loans led to widespread abandonment of homes. 
continuing to increase.  Mortgage bankers were sued in 32 percent of these cases.  
Borrower class actions made up 43 percent of all cases.  Securities cases constituted 22 
percent of the cases.  Subprime Mortgage Litigation Outpacing Savings-and-Loan 
Crisis of the Early 1990s, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/ 
idUS227647+14-Feb-2008+BW20080214/. 
 243. Vikas Baja & Jenny Anderson, Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on 
Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at A1. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id.  Some of these loans were “exception loans” to a small degree, such as a 
failure to meet a minimum credit score.  Not all exceptions were very bad loans. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Karen Pierog, Cleveland Sues 21Banks Over Mortgage Foreclosures, 
REUTERS, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/bankingfinancial-SP/idUSN112 
9443220080114. 
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VII. CHANGES REQUIRED 
A.  Consumer Counseling 
Some commentators have proposed that people taking on mort-
gages should be counseled about the financial impact of the mortgage on 
their lives.248  Clearly, some mortgagors need independent financial ad-
vice before executing a mortgage.  The problems involved in requiring 
this advice are in determining the people who need the advice and in 
determining the people who should give the advice.  Regulation Z could 
require that a lender making a non prime mortgage must pay for 
borrower counseling from a non-profit mortgage counseling agency.  A 
borrower’s attorney should have the responsibility for giving financial 
counsel to the borrower.  It would seem this should be an ethical obliga-
tion if the mortgage appears to be beyond the financial means of the 
borrower or has features the borrower should be warned about.  The 
ethical requirements for attorneys involved in real estate closings should 
include a duty to provide financial counseling to mortgagors who will be 
at significant risk because of the excessive cost of the mortgage. 
Counseling speculators, however, would probably not have influ-
enced their decisions.  Greed and a desire for easy profits can lead to bad 
decisions and a willingness to ignore any rational advice.  In this con-
text, the lender should bear any responsibility for making loans to spe-
culators.  This requires proper information relating to the mortgagor’s 
income, ability to repay and plans for use of the mortgage proceeds.  
Loans used for speculative purposes need to be identified clearly 
through prerequisite due diligence by the lender, so that if the mortgage 
is to be sold, any possible purchaser of the mortgage can properly assess 
the risk associated with the speculative mortgage.  Adequate “flagging” 
of the speculative loans must be required of lenders. 
B.  Transparency 
Investment banks who package MBS must be required to disclose 
the quality of the mortgages within each package.  Considering the fees 
charged and the review by attorneys of each package, it is not unrea-
sonable for the issuer to provide adequate information about the mort-
 
 248. See, e.g., ROBERT SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 123 (2008), available at 
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8714.pdf. 
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gages in the packages.  Merely offering an opinion by a CRA is not 
sufficient information for an investor to make a properly informed 
investment decision.  The mortgages must be properly graded, and the 
grading information included in the loan package. 
C.  National Registration and Grading of Securitized Mortgages 
Some commentators have argued for more federal regulation of 
mortgage lending.249  More transparency is required in the securitization 
of mortgages.  More information must be given to prospective investors.  
Too much reliance has been placed upon CRAs.250  Additionally, this 
system has failed terribly to fairly gauge the risks of investments.  Trust 
must be reintroduced into the MBS market.  Without that trust, the 
market cannot adequately perform. 
Each mortgage must be properly graded and clearly labeled, with 
the grader holding responsibility for the grade assigned.  If a lender 
wishes to sell a mortgage, it is important to adequately disclose the 
quality of that mortgage as opposed to making the mortgage without 
adequately evaluating the likelihood that the mortgage would be repaid.  
In some instances, it appears that virtually no consideration was given to 
whether the mortgage would be repaid.  This lack of responsibility in 
making the mortgage stemmed from the ease with which these deficient 
mortgages could be sold to unwary investors.  In order for confidence to 
be restored, investors must know what they are buying.  Before a 
mortgage can be sold, the mortgage lender should verify certain aspects 
of the mortgage application, such as the borrower’s credit score and 
income, the loan to value ratio, and the amount of the down payment. 
There should be no “exception loans”.  Each loan should be graded on a 
standard system; for example, a loan could be graded from A through E, 
based upon the likelihood of repayment.  The issues involved in the 
grading – whether this is a primary residence, whether the credit score is 
somewhat deficient, the size of the down payment and whether the 
purchase is for investment purpose – should be reflected in the grade and 
should be disclosed to the purchaser of the loan. The lender should be 
responsible for any negligent or fraudulent information he provided.251 
 
 249. See, e.g., Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting 
the Bad Loans Win, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737 (2008). 
 250. See Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization 
of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 90-91 (2008). 
 251. The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act was introduced into 
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Part of the securitization process should be the grading and regis-
tration of loans to be sold.  The information relating to the loans in a 
package of loans should be entered and registered on a national system, 
allowing prospective purchasers to clearly evaluate a proposed purchase.  
The process should be similar to a public offering prospectus, but should 
be far less onerous to issuers and simpler to produce. 
D.  Responsibility 
Finally and most importantly, in order to regain confidence in the 
mortgage market and the MBS market, responsibility must attach to 
each decision maker.  If a person will suffer the consequences of his or 
her decision, then the quality of the decision will improve.  The MBS 
market created a disconnect between the decision maker and the respon-
sibility for the decision.  This must be corrected.  Mortgage originators 
must be made responsible for the consequences of bad loans.  If the loan 
fails to perform, the originator must suffer the consequences. 
CRAs are currently exempt from liability for errors, mistakes and 
misstatements in their ratings process.  This has caused ratings to be 
issued which do not reflect the true risk involved for investment in 
MBSs.  These rating agencies must bear responsibility to the investors, 
not just their clients, and the investment banks.  More transparency is re-
quired in how the ratings are determined.  Each individual bundle needs 
to provide adequate information about its true risk.  The number of 
mortgages included and the quality of those mortgages must be dis-
closed.  Mere statistical analysis is insufficient.  An investor needs more 
information in order to make a rational investment decision.  The secu-
rities laws need to protect investors from the investment banks and the 
CRAs. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In order to maintain a vibrant real estate market and to encourage 
home ownership, it is important that mortgage securitization and the 
 
Congress by Representative Bradley Miller, and passed the House of Representatives 
on November 15, 2007.  The Act would establish a national Mortgage Licensing 
System Registry; impose a duty of care on loan originators and establish further 
restrictions on nonqualified mortgages.  H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (as passed by the 
House, Nov. 15, 2007).  The Bill was referred to the Senate.  As of December 9, 2008, 
no further action has been taken. 
770 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
secondary mortgage market emerge from the present crisis intact.  The 
MBS market has proven over many years to be a valuable source of 
money for long-term growth in the United States, allowing individuals 
to achieve their dreams of owning their own residence.  It is vital this 
market is restored and a vibrant secondary market is reestablished.  
Significant changes must be made, in order to properly allocate respon-
sibility among the various entities who participate in the market. 
There are, of course, costs associated with regulation and allocating 
responsibility.  Lenders will have to either insure their losses, maintain 
higher reserves or increase their lending standards.  All of these alterna-
tives will result in higher costs to lenders and borrowers.  Given the 
incredible costs involved in cleaning up the wreckage of an unregulated 
market, these regulatory costs seem far more reasonable.  The invest-
ment banks who sell MBSs must be required to provide adequate infor-
mation to investors as to the mortgages included in the package, includ-
ing whether each mortgage meets conforming standards.  The securities 
regulators must provide adequate protection for investors by requiring 
that issuers adequately disclose the true risks involved with bundled 
mortgages.  In order to reinvigorate the mortgage backed securities 
market, significant new rules must be implemented. 
 
